of saintliness might be that saintliness is above honour and that there is nothing above saintliness.

5 For example, young manual workers gain such a large measure of financial independence at a time when students and technical apprentices lead an economically restricted life, that the working youths propose fashions and models of behaviour which are copied by their cultural superiors. At the same time knowledge retains its importance as an element of social ranking. The resulting ambiguities of value orientation and of clearcut social identification are important elements in the assessment of our cultural trends.

6 I first used this term, borrowed from Henry Maine and also that of *sex-linked characteristics*, borrowed from genetics, in my Frazer Lecture delivered in Glasgow in 1959.

Julian Pitt-Rivers

HONOUR AND SOCIAL STATUS

Chapter One

The theme of honour invites the moralist more often than the social scientist. An honour, a man of honour or the epithet honourable can be applied appropriately in any society, since they are evaluatory terms, but this fact has tended to conceal from the moralists that not only what is honourable but what honour *is* have varied within Europe from one period to another, from one region to another and above all from one class to another. The notion of honour is something more than a means of expressing approval or disapproval. It possesses a general structure which is seen in the institutions and customary evaluations which are particular to a given culture. We might liken it to the concept of magic in the sense that, while its principles can be detected anywhere, they are clothed in conceptions which are not exactly equivalent from one place to another. Like magic also, it validates itself by an appeal to the facts (on which it imposes its own interpretations) and becomes thereby involved in contradictions which reflect the conflicts of the social structure and which this essay will attempt to unravel. In the first part I shall examine this general structure as it is found in Western Europe without much concern for the local and temporal variations. In the second part I shall examine the semantic range of the notion of honour in modern Andalusian society.

The Concept of Honour

Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his *claim* to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his *right* to pride. Students of the minutiae of personal relations have observed that they are much concerned with the ways in which people extort from others

the validation of the image which they cherish of themselves[1] and the two aspects of honour may be reconciled in those terms. Honour, therefore, provides a nexus between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them. As such, it implies not merely an habitual preference for a given mode of conduct, but the entitlement to a certain treatment in return. The right to pride is the right to status (in the popular as well as the anthropological sense of the word), and status is established through the recognition of a certain social identity. When the English girl claims to be 'not that kind of a girl' she is talking about her honour, and in Calderón's plays the heroes invoke their honour with a standard phrase, *Soy quién soy*, I am who I am.

The claimant to honour must get himself accepted at his own evaluation, must be granted reputation, or else the claim becomes mere vanity, an object of ridicule or contempt – but granted by whom? The moralist retains the right to arbitrate the claims to honour in accordance with his own values (and many of the treatises on honour are, in fact, tirades against the mores of the day[2]), but the social scientist is concerned with the facts and processes of recognition: how, on what grounds and by whom is the claim to honour recognized?

Every political authority displays the pretention to incarnate the moral values of the society which it governs, to 'command what is right and prohibit what is wrong'; it therefore claims the right to bestow 'honours' and it follows that those whom it honours are, so it maintains, honourable. When this is accepted by the whole population then the problem of honour presents no quandary. The argument goes like this: the sentiment of honour inspires conduct which is honourable, the conduct receives recognition and establishes reputation, and reputation is finally sanctified by the bestowal of honours. Honour felt becomes honour claimed and honour claimed becomes honour paid. But this argument is not always justified in a complex society where consensus is not uniform. The individual's worth is not the same in the view of one group as in that of another, while the political authorities may view him in a different light again. Moreover, it is not only a question of differing evaluations of the same person. The qualities needed to exert leadership in a rural community are not those needed to please at court. Honour as a sentiment

and mode of conduct becomes separated from honour as a qualification for the Honours List. The two conceptions might be placed at the poles between which common usage fluctuates: at one pole we might put the notion of honour derived from conduct in the sense in which 'All is lost save honour', and at the other, the titles which are piled by the usurper upon the traitors who helped him to power. Adherence to the code of honour is thus juxtaposed to the possession of honours.[3]

If honour establishes status, the converse is also true, and where status is ascribed by birth, honour derives not only from individual reputation but from antecedence.[4] The two conceptions can conflict. The theme of the story of the Cid is the triumph of honour derived from excellence over honour derived from birth, a theme which remains as popular today as ever. The well-born are assumed to possess by inheritance the appropriate character and sentiments which will be seen in their conduct, but when it is asserted they do not, as in the case of the Cid's antagonists, the heirs of Carrión, the concept of honour faces an ambiguity which can only be resolved by an appeal to some tribunal, the 'fount of honour': public opinion, the monarch, or the ordeal of the judicial combat which implied a direct appeal to God. Once the monarchy no longer allowed direct access to the Deity in this matter, but took on the entire responsibility of arbitrating the claims to honour, the court incurred the criticisms which arose from the conflict inherent in the notion, such as the popular opinion which regarded the honour of rustics as more worthy than that of courtiers[5], or the wry comment of Voltaire who maintained, in answer to Montesquieu, that it is precisely at court that there is always least honour.[6]

The claim to excellence is relative. It is always implicitly the claim to excel over others. Hence honour is the basis of precedence. Hobbes, sternly ignoring the views of the moralists from Aristotle onwards discusses honour in terms of this and formulates what I would call 'the pecking-order theory of honour'.[7] In a society of equals, such as a community of peasants, to attain the respect of one's fellows may be as high as honour can point, but where we approach the pole where honour is established through the bestowal of honours, there must needs be competition for them. Where there is a hierarchy of honour, the person who submits to the precedence of others recognizes his inferior status.

He is dishonoured in the sense that he has disavowed his claim to the higher status to which he aspired. The superb mottos of the aristocracy of Europe rub in the point: *Roi ne puis, duc ne daigne, Rohan suis*, or prouder still: *Después de Dios, la Casa de Quiros*. We can see the hierarchy of honour stretching from its source in God, through a King whose legitimacy depends upon divine sanction, through the ranks of the social structure down to those who had no honour at all, the heretics and the infamous. It is not only among the aristocracies, however, that honour has a competitive aspect, though the struggle for precedence may be more acute among them. The victor in any competition for honour finds his reputation enhanced by the humiliation of the vanquished. This is as true on the street-corner as in the lists. It was believed at one time in Italy by the common people that one who gave an insult thereby took to himself the reputation of which he deprived the other.[8] The Church of England hymn puts the point succinctly:

> Conquering Kings their titles take
> From the foes they captive make

but the hymn goes on to contrast this principle of honour with the Christian ethic. Since the treatises on honour first began to appear in the sixteenth century, Churchmen have stressed the basis of true honour in virtue and supported their thesis with the authority of Aristotle, yet they seem never to have convinced the protagonists in the struggle for honour, nor even for that matter all the writers on the subject. Nor do they appear to have persuaded the monarchs in whose gift honour lay who, in dispensing it, followed more often their personal whims or considerations of political expediency; honours have often been for sale by a sovereign with empty coffers. Yet if sovereigns have fallen short of the ideal of bestowing honour only on the virtuous, the same can be said of the *vox populi*. Respect and precedence are paid to those who claim it and are sufficiently powerful to enforce their claim. Just as possession is said to be nine-tenths of the law, so the *de facto* achievement of honour depends upon the ability to silence anyone who would dispute the title. The reputation of a dangerous man is liable to assure him precedence over a virtuous man; he may not be thought privately to be honourable, but while no one is prepared to question the matter, he is treated as

though he were and granted the precedence which he claims. On the field of honour might is right.

There are reasons in the nature of honour itself which submit it to the shifts of power, and these will become clear if we examine how honour is recognized or impugned, and by whom. We should start by noting the intimate relation between honour and the physical person. The rituals by which honour is formally bestowed involve a ceremony which commonly centres upon the head of the protagonist whether it is the crowning of a monarch or the touch on the head with a book which confers academic degrees in the University of Oxford. As much may be said of many rites of passage and in fact we should regard honorific rituals as rites of passage. The payment of honour in daily life is accorded through the offering of precedence (so often expressed through an analogy with the head), and through the demonstrations of respect which are commonly associated with the head whether it is bowed, touched, uncovered or covered; while, again, the head of the person honoured is used to demonstrate his status whether it is adorned, dressed in a distinctive way, prohibited to be touched or even if it is chopped off.[9] It is worth observing in the latter case that the right to be executed in this way, even though the execution itself is a dishonour, preserves a recognition of the honourable status of the victim which derives from his birth and which the dishonourable personal conduct he was condemned for does not suffice to obliterate, since it is the concern not only of the individual but of his lineage. Decapitation recognized that there was something worth chopping off. Even where polite society has outlawed physical violence it retains the ritual slap on the face as a challenge to settle an affair of honour,[10] and it was commonly admitted that offences to honour could only be redeemed through blood. 'La lessive de l'honneur ne se coule qu'au sang.'[11]

Any form of physical affront implies an affront to honour since the 'ideal sphere' surrounding a person's honour of which Simmel speaks is defiled.[12] Moreover, the significance of the presence of a person is highly relevant to his honour. That which is an affront if said to his face may not dishonour if said behind his back. That which, if done in his presence, is offensive may not be so if he is not there to resent it. What is offensive is not the action in itself but the act of obliging the offended one to witness

it. Thus in the villages of rural Andalusia a father cannot admit the presence of his daughter's suitor – custom imposes an avoidance between the two – yet he would be dishonoured if his daughter were to marry without being courted, not the contrary. In all these instances we can see that honour is exalted or desecrated through the physical person and through actions related to it which are not merely symbolic representations of a moral state of affairs, but *are* what we might otherwise infer they represent, that is to say, they are transactions of honour – not the bill of goods, but the goods themselves. Therefore, the act of resentment is the touchstone of honour, for a physical affront is a dishonour, regardless of the moral issues involved, and creates a situation in which the honour of the affronted person is in jeopardy and requires 'satisfaction' if it is to return to its normal condition.[13] This satisfaction may be acquired through an apology which is a verbal act of self-humiliation or it may require, and if the apology is not forthcoming does require, avenging. To leave an affront unavenged is to leave one's honour in a state of desecration and this is therefore equivalent to cowardice. Hence the popularity among the mottos of the aristocracy of the theme of *nemo me impune lacessit* (no man may harm me with impunity). The equation of honour with valour and cowardice with dishonour, apparent in this, derives directly from the structure of the notion, quite regardless of the historical explanations which have been offered of this fact.

We have not so far considered the question of intention at all, and have implied that it is subsidiary in cases of physical affront. Intentions are, however, all important to the establishment of honour since they demonstrate the sentiment and character from which honour *qua* conduct derives. To show dishonourable intentions is to be dishonoured regardless of the result. To desire to run away in battle is dishonouring whether one succeeds in doing so or not, while honour – and in this case honour through the conduct which gives proof of proper sentiments is clearly meant – can still be saved when all else is lost. Moreover, intention is a necessary component of the competition for honour expressed in the challenge; the essence of an affront is that another should dare to affront one. Therefore, when apologies are offered they normally take the form of a denial of the intention to cause offence. By proclaiming it to be unintentional the

offender reduces the gravity of the affront; it makes the apology easier to accept while it also reduces the humiliation of the apologizer and therefore makes it easier to give. Thus, one can see that while honour is established or impugned by physical behaviour this is because certain intentions are made manifest in it, are, as it were, necessarily implicit. To maintain that one did not intend what one did is to require a certain indulgence on the part of the listener – an indulgence which may not be granted if he has been seriously affronted; for actions speak plainer than words where honour is concerned. Yet words also have their value as actions and in this field the way things are said is more important than the substance of what is said. The apology which does not sound sincere aggravates the offence.

To sum up, both words and actions are significant within the code of honour because they are expressions of attitude which claim, accord or deny honour. Honour, however, is only irrevocably committed by attitudes expressed in the presence of witnesses, the representatives of public opinion. The problem of public knowledge as an essential ingredient of an affront has been stressed by various authors, and it has even been doubted that honour could be committed by words uttered in the absence of witnesses. On the other hand, a person can *feel* himself to be dishonoured even if the dishonour is not known. Yet there is no disagreement that the extent of the damage to reputation relates to the range of public opinion within which the damage is broadcast. This is the basis of the ~~dilemma~~ which faces the hero of Calderón's, 'A ~~secreto agravio, secreta venganza~~'; how to cleanse without publicizing his dishonour. Public opinion forms therefore a tribunal before which the claims to honour are brought, 'the court of reputation' as it has been called, and against its judgements there is no redress. For this reason it is said that public ridicule kills.

Given that a man's honour is committed by his estimation of the intention of others, everything depends upon how an action is interpreted. Certain actions have a ritual significance which is conventionally recognized, others depend for their interpretation upon the nuances of manners. To affront ambiguously enables a man to attain his ends without perhaps having to face the response to his affront; he can at least put his antagonist to the test in such a way as to avoid the responsibility

for the breach of the peace which ensues. The opening scene of *Romeo and Juliet* provides an illustration:

'Do you bite your thumb at us, sir?'
'No sir, I do not bite my thumb at you, sir, but I bite my thumb.'

The intention, though denied, was plain enough to provoke a scrap. The ambiguous affront has the advantage also that it places the antagonist in a dilemma: if he responds, the affront can be denied and he can be declared touchy, quarrelsome and therefore ridiculous; if he does not respond, he can be made to appear cowardly and therefore dishonoured. If a man sees no insult and can be justified in seeing none, then his honour is not jeopardized. Hence the possibility of 'turning a blind eye'. But if he realizes that he has been insulted (and others will usually help him to realize it), yet does nothing about it, then he is dishonoured. The ambiguous affront which provokes no reaction is therefore commonly followed by a more explicit one, if the intention is indeed to challenge. The victim of an affront is dishonoured only at the point where he is forced to recognize that he has been. A man is therefore always the guardian and arbiter of his own honour, since it relates to his own consciousness and is too closely allied to his physical being, his will, and his judgement for anyone else to take responsibility for it.

When a person reacts to a slight upon the honour of another, it can only be because his own is involved. Thus, according to ancient French law,[14] a member of a slighted man's family or lineage could pick up the glove, or a man bound in liege to him, but no one else. The pact of brotherhood between knights referred to by Caro Baroja (p. 95) created such a lien and, in *Romeo and Juliet*, Mercutio considered his friendship with Romeo a sufficient justification. The possibility of being represented by a champion in the judicial combat was restricted to those who were judged unable to defend their honour personally: women,[15] the aged or infirm, or persons of a social status which prohibited them from responding to a challenge, in particular, churchmen and, of course, royalty. It must otherwise always be an individual's own choice whether to maintain or abandon his claim to honour, whether to react to a slight and vindicate himself or to accept it and the dishonour which accompanies it. Thus a man is dishonoured if, when he is able to do so for himself, he

allows another to pick up the glove for him. This remains true even though at certain periods the seconds were expected also to fight.

The ultimate vindication of honour lies in physical violence and when other means fail the obligation exists, not only in the formal code of honour but in social milieux which admit no such code, to revert to it. This is congruent with what has been said already about the relation between honour and the physical person. Within the formal code the duel displays the principles involved: the offended party, judging that his honour was impugned, issued a challenge by which he invoked the honour of his offender and demanded satisfaction. The offender was obliged then either to retract and offer apologies (a course of action which was incompatible with the conception which many men had of their own honour) or to accept. Yet 'satisfaction' is not synonymous with triumph, only with the opportunity to achieve it under conventionally defined conditions which imply a judgement of destiny. In this sense the duel shares with the judicial combat the nature of an ordeal, though the implication was manifest only in the case of the judicial combat which was ordained by the magistrates as a means of validating an oath. God would surely not protect a perjuror who had taken his name in vain. In this way the realities of power, be they no more than the hazards of the field of honour, were endowed with divine sanction. The fact of victory in the judicial combat was something more than hazard for it implied validation, and the satisfaction by which honour was restored was something more than personal satisfaction, for it was accorded by the appeal to the test of courage regardless of the outcome. The duel finished the matter; the quarrel could not honourably be prosecuted thereafter, either by the contestants or their partisans. On this account the duel and the judicial combat are to be distinguished from the feud which, even though it is inspired by similar sentiments, requires none of the formal equality of the duel nor its ceremonial setting and claims no judicial character for its outcome. Thus, unlike the jousting lists which promoted the competition for honour, the duel is rather the means of settling disputes with regard to it. It is not surprising then that it has tended to be frowned upon by the state which has frequently forbidden it, even during epochs when it remained the accepted

custom of the aristocracy. (The Church, in keeping with its commitment in this regard, also prohibited it at the Council of Trent.)

The appeal to a private ordeal cuts out the 'fount of honour' from its role in determining the honourable status of its subjects. Like Richard II, the state prefers to have the last word in such matters rather than remit them to the unpredictable hand of destiny. Yet seen from the individual's point of view, to have recourse to justice is to abnegate one's claim to settle one's debts of honour for oneself, the only way in which they can be settled. When challenged to fight, it is not honourable to demand police protection. Therefore, while the sovereign is the 'fount of honour' in one sense, he is also the enemy of honour in another, since he claims to arbitrate in regard to it. He takes over the functions of the Divinity thanks to his sacred character. The change from the period when the law prescribed the judicial combat to that when the duel was made illegal corresponds to an extension of the competence of the state in judicial matters. Yet no man of honour, least of all an aristocrat, was prepared to remit to the courts the settlement of his affairs of honour. Hence the inefficacy of the legislation against duelling.

The conflict between honour and legality is a fundamental one which persists to this day. For to go to law for redress is to confess publicly that you have been wronged and the demonstration of your vulnerability places your honour in jeopardy, a jeopardy from which the 'satisfaction' of legal compensation at the hands of a secular authority hardly redeems it. Moreover, it gives your offender the chance to humiliate you further by his attitude during all the delays of court procedure, which in fact can do nothing to restore your honour but merely advertises its plight. To request compensation or even to invite apologies are courses of action which involve risk to honour if they are not adopted with the implication that they cloak a demand for satisfaction. If someone steps on your toe inadvertently while getting on to a bus, you humiliate yourself by complaining, even if apologies are proffered. The man of honour=precedence says nothing at the time, but catches his offender a sharp one on the shin as he gets off; his honour is revealed to have been jeopardized only by the action which restores it to grace and he has circumvented the risks of placing it in foreign keeping. *Nemo*

me impune lacessit therefore is not only a favourite motto of the aristocracy but of any group which values this conception of honour. The resemblance between the mores of the street-corner society and those of the aristocracy, both contemptuous of legality, derives from this: the aristocracy claims the right to honour=precedence by the tradition which makes them the leaders of society, arbiters rather than 'arbitrated' and therefore 'a law unto themselves'. The sacred quality of high status is demonstrated in freedom from the sanctions which apply to ordinary mortals. (The same principle explains the incest of the Gods.) On the other hand, street-corner society claims also to be a law unto itself, not because it is above the law but because it is outside it and because the concept of honour=virtue has no claim upon its aspirations.

When honour is impugned it can be vindicated. Yet the power to impugn the honour of another man depends also on the relative status of the contestants. An inferior is not deemed to possess sufficient honour to resent the affront of a superior. A superior can ignore the affront of an inferior, since his honour is not committed by it – though he may choose to punish an impudence. The combatants in a duel must recognize equality since they stand on equal terms in it. Montesquieu refers to the mediaeval laws[16] according to which a judicial combat could take place between a gentleman and a villein. Yet the former was bound to appear, then, without the symbols of his rank and to fight as a villein on foot. This disposition disappears from the code of honour of a later age. When Voltaire answered provocatively a discourtesy from the Chevalier de Rohan, the latter had his henchmen beat him and Voltaire's noble friends declined to take up his cause. In addition to his hurt he was covered in ridicule. He did not forgive the Duc de Sully at whose house the incident occurred. Yet the Chevalier was not apparently dishonoured in the eyes of his peers, even though he evaded the duel to which Voltaire attempted to challenge him by procurring his imprisonment and exile. A man is answerable for his honour only to his social equals, that is to say, to those with whom he can conceptually compete.

The intention of a person, we have said, is paramount in relation to his honour, but it is the intention evident in his actions

rather than that expressed in his words. A man commits his honour only through his *sincere* intentions. Giving his word of honour, he asserts sincerity and stakes his honour upon the issue, be it a promise regarding the future or an assurance regarding past events. If his true will was not behind the promise or the assertion, then he is not dishonoured if he fails to fulfil the promise or turns out to have lied. If he intended to deceive, he is not dishonoured by the revelation that he did so, since he 'did not mean it', he 'had his fingers crossed', that is to say, he meant the opposite of what he said. Yet according to the rules of this puerile device for disengaging honour, the fingers must be held crossed while the words are spoken; they cannot be crossed afterwards. This fact demonstrates the essential truth that it is lack of steadfastness in intentions which is dishonouring, not misrepresentation of them.

We can explain now something which appears anomalous in the literature of honour: on the one hand honour demands keeping faith and to break one's word or to lie is the most dishonourable conduct, yet in fact a man is permitted to lie and to deceive without forfeiting his honour.[17] The formal vocabulary of challenges commonly bears the implication of oath-breaker or liar. The judicial combat was a means of proving which of the two contestants was a liar, while, later, the word *mentita* (giving the lie) figures in the Italian codes of honour as the formal provocation which cannot easily be refused. In the Spanish drama *mentís* carried the same significance. On the other hand, King Ferdinand of Aragon boasted of the nine times he deceived the King of France, and Don Juan, in the play of Tirso de Molina, in spite of the deceptions he had perpetrated, declared himself a man of honour as he gripped the stone hand of the Comendador and gave this as his reason for accepting the predictable consequences.[18] It appears to me that critics of recent times like the dramatists who took up the theme have neglected to consider the fact that Don Juan is a man of honour. He is a rascal by their standards and indeed an offender against loyalty, hospitality, friendship and religion, as Professor Parker has noted.[19] But such a view neglects to examine the concept of honour which is displayed in the play and to say, like Professor Parker, that Don Juan is the negation of 'Caballerosidad' in every respect is to beg the question. Don Juan is a protagonist of

the 'pecking-order theory of honour'. He is an affronter of other men, a humiliator and deceiver by design of both men and women, a scoffer at the moral and social orders and, in his sexual relations, a 'scalp-hunter', but not a voluptuary and not, be it noted, an adulterer; his four female victims are presumed virgins; he is not a man to grant precedence to another even in this.

To take an example from contemporary ethnography, the Greek peasants whose concern for their honour is very great, regard deception involving a lie as perfectly legitimate and honourable behaviour.[20]

The anomaly is therefore this: while to lie in order to deceive is quite honourable, to be called a liar in public is a grave affront. The explanation lies in the ambiguity as to whether the word given did in fact commit the honour of the liar, and this can only be established by a knowledge of his true intentions. If it did not, that is to say, if his intentions were misrepresented but not rescinded, then the person deceived, not the deceiver, is humiliated. If, however, the lie was told or the promise made because the liar did not dare to affront his antagonist, or if, having committed his honour to another man, he lacks steadfastness, then the liar is dishonoured. He has desecrated that which is sacred to him, his true self. The whole question hinges therefore on the moral commitment of the liar. To lie is to deny the truth to someone who has the right to be told it and this right exists only where respect is due. Children are taught to tell the truth to their elders who are under no reciprocal obligation, since it is they who decide what the children should be told. The duty to tell the truth curtails the personal autonomy of the man who may otherwise feel himself entitled, on account of his social pre-eminence, to represent reality as he pleases and offer no justification. The moral commitment to tell the truth derives then from the social commitment to persons to whom it is due. This is the meaning of the story of the emperor's cloak. At the same time, a man may not question the truth of an assertion made by one who does not owe it to him. The right to the truth and the right to withhold it both attach to honour and to contest these rights is to place honour in jeopardy.

A man of honour may not lie to someone whom he is not prepared to affront, for to deceive a person intentionally is to

humiliate him, and this amounts to an insult to which the norms of the community define the modes of honourable response. Given the ambiguity of the interpretation of his action, the person thus offended is entitled to interpret the lie as an act of cowardice and to declare the liar dishonoured by it. The *mentita* therefore represents a counter insult which demands of the person accused as a liar that he demonstrate by his response that he did in fact intend to affront, under pain of being proved otherwise a coward. Yet if he responds to the challenge, he is not dishonoured (for it is not dishonouring to affront another man): he is only dishonoured as a liar if he fails to do so.[21]

Hence the importance of the oath in relation to honour. It commits the honour of the swearer just as 'crossed fingers' liberate it and aims to eliminate the ambiguity as to his true intentions. By invoking that which is sacred to him – his God, the bones of saints, his loyalty to his sovereign, the health of his mother or simply his own honour – he activates an implicit curse against himself in the eventuality of his failure to implement his oath or, at least, he assures that public opinion is entitled to judge him dishonoured. Moreover, he cannot attain the honour of the person to whom he is bound by oath by deceiving him. The latter is untouched by his deceit. If he proves false, the dishonour is his alone; retribution can be left to public opinion or to the Gods.

Yet even an oath which is not made freely is not binding, nor is a word of honour which is not intended as such. The attempt to use ritual to commit the honour of a man comes up against the difficulty that no man *can* commit his honour against his will, since his honour is what he wills and the attempt to oblige him to do so invites him to 'cross his fingers'. The ritual of the oath, like the rites of the church, is invalid without the intention of the participant.

I have used the word 'sacred' in a colloquial sense which may well raise objections from anthropologists. Yet in saying that a man's honour is sacred to him I do no more than repeat what is stated in a host of contexts (including the American Declaration of Independence). It is literally more exact to say that a man's true self is blended with the sacred. In the oath, the sacred is invoked in order to commit honour in ways which indicate something more than a conditional curse: 'I swear by all that is

sacred to me' presupposes such a close connection. We have noted also that the same forms of conduct demonstrate respect for persons of superior honour as for religious objects, while the position of the monarch as both the fount of human honour and appointed by the Grace of God brings a divine sanction to the social system. His honour, in addition to connecting a man to others within the hierarchy of his society, connects him to his sovereign and to the Deity: 'A traitor to my God, my King and me' was the form of the indictment which expressed the challenge in *Richard II* (Act I, Scene 3).

Moreover, the notion, common in all the languages of Europe, that honour is susceptible of 'defilement' or 'stains' of which it requires to be purified entitles us to mark a resemblance to the customs of primitive societies whose chiefs are the object of prohibitions similar to those which circumscribe the man of honour. The early anthropologists might well, in fact, have translated the word *mana* as *honour*,[22] at least in the contexts in which it referred to persons, and noted that the Polynesian victor who acquired the *mana* of his slain foe by taking his name was behaving rather like the conquering kings of the hymn. But they became interested in the subject while studying magic and the 'primitive mind', and they therefore stressed the differences rather than the resemblances between the customs which they studied and their own. They could with difficulty envisage the 'savage' as having honour such as they themselves possessed and the age in which they wrote was disinclined to perceive the 'irrationality' of the primitive mind in its own attitudes to social status. However, this is not the place to pursue the analogy, which would confront us with other problems.

We have so far discussed honour as a purely individual attribute. Now we must examine how it is related to social solidarities. Social groups possess a collective honour in which their members participate; the dishonourable conduct of one reflects upon the honour of all, while a member shares in the honour of his group. 'I am who I am' subsumes 'whom I am associated with'. 'Dime con quién andas y te diré quién eres' says the Spanish proverb (Tell me whom you associate with and I will tell you who you are). Honour pertains to social groups of any size, from the nuclear family whose head is responsible for the honour of all its

members to the nation whose members' honour is bound up with their fidelity to their sovereign. In both the family and the monarchy a single person symbolizes the group whose collective honour is vested in his person. The members owe obedience and respect of a kind which commits their individual honour without redress. Here intentions are irrelevant to the identity of the essential being, for the individual is born a son and a subject, he does not compete or contract in order to become so. Thus parricide and regicide are sacrilegious acts which homicide is not.

The idea that the honour of the group resides in its head was fundamental to the conception of aristocracy and assured the fidelity through the oath of the liegeman to his lord; the inferior in such a relationship participated in the honour of his chief and was therefore interested in defending it. Yet the principle holds beyond the ties of the feudal system; the system of patronage depends upon it, also. Hence the hubris of the tyrant's minion, the vicarious glory of the noble's servant.

Yet there exist other social groups whose leader is an elected representative and whose person, as opposed to his post, possesses none of this sacred quality. Here the tribunal of public opinion is sovereign: in trade-guilds, municipalities or republics.

This observation provided Montesquieu with his basic dichotomy: a distinction between the monarchy whose operative principle is honour, and the republic whose operative principle is virtue, by which he meant civic virtue, something rather like what is meant today by 'citizenship'. He encountered difficulty in making himself understood to those who showed themselves unwilling to adopt his usage.[23] The distinction was criticized by those who maintained that there was honour in a republic, by those who maintained that there was virtue in a monarchy, and by Voltaire whose opinion has already been given.

The difficulty of distinguishing between the two terms, honour and virtue, was responsible for those confusions which were neither the first nor the last of their kind, which centre on the meanings of the word honour: honour which derives from virtuous conduct and that honour which situates an individual socially and determines his right to precedence. The two senses appear to be so far removed from one another that one may ask why they were, and still are, expressed by the same word, why the languages of Europe are so determined to avoid clarity in this matter.

The political significance of the sacred is that it arbitrates questions of value, lays the limits to what can be done or maintained without sacrilege and defines the unconditional allegiances of the members of a society. Authority as political power claims always to be moral authority, and the word therefore enjoys the same duality as honour from the moment that the legitimacy of the use of force is disputed. It cannot admit that its actions are devoid of legitimacy. In the same vein, no man of honour ever admits that his honour = precedence is not synonymous with his honour = virtue. To do so would be to admit himself dishonoured. For him there is only one concept, his honour. However far apart the abstract notions of precedence and virtue may be, they come together in the individual at the level of behaviour. Therefore, as we have seen in the instance of the lie, an action *may* be potentially dishonourable, but it is only when this action is publicly condemned that it dishonours. Hence, just as capital assures credit, so the possession of honour guarantees against dishonour, for the simple reason that it places a man (if he has enough of it) in a position in which he cannot be challenged or judged. The king cannot be dishonoured. What he *is* guarantees the evaluation of his actions. He is above criticism. This is what I call the principle of *Honi soit qui mal y pense.*'[24] It is incorporated in the jurisprudence of honour in a provision, implicit throughout, which is expressed by Bryson in the following terms: 'Just as honouring one who was undeserving was a kind of contempt, and true honour dwelled rather in him who honoured, so an offence given to an honourable man stained only the offender. As for the offended party, he was still more worthy of honour if he bore the offence magnanimously.'[25]

At the level of political action, the concept of authority partakes of the same nature; the king can do no wrong because he is the king and therefore the arbiter of right. Reference to authority takes precedence over reference to privately reasoned evaluations. What God, King, Country, or Party says is right. *Lèse-majesté* is the sister of rebellion and criticism of established authority, beyond the limits which convention allows, is an act of disloyalty. In this sense, therefore, the respect felt for the monarch possesses something of the same power to render sacred as the reverence felt for the Divine: in paying this respect, we abnegate our right to question and bind ourselves to accept what

might otherwise appear to us wrong. The arbitrary nature of sacred power extends beyond the frontiers of religion.[26]

The ritual and ceremonial aspects of honour assure not only the opportunity for those who feel respect to pay it, but they commit those who pay it even if they do not feel it. Regardless of private feelings they serve to establish the consensus of the society with regard to the order of precedence; they demonstrate what is acceptable by reference to what is accepted. If the honour felt by the individual becomes honour paid by the society, it is equally the case that the honour which is paid by the society sets the standards for what the individual should feel. Transactions of honour therefore serve these purposes: they not only provide, on the psychological side, a nexus between the ideals of society and their reproduction in the actions of individuals – honour commits men to act as they should (even if opinions differ as to how they should act) – but, on the social side, between the ideal order and the terrestrial order, validating the realities of power and making the sanctified order of precedence correspond to them. Thus, thanks to its duality, honour does something which the philosophers say they cannot do: derive an *ought* from an *is*; whatever *is* becomes *right*, the *de facto* is made *de jure*, the victor is crowned with laurels, the war-profiteer is knighted, the tyrant becomes the monarch, the bully, a chief. The reconciliation between the social order as we find it and the social order which we revere is accomplished thanks to the confusion which hinges upon the duality of honour and its associated concepts. It is a confusion which fulfils the function of social integration by ensuring the legitimation of established power.

I have attempted to discover the general structure of the notion of honour in the literature of Western Europe and have therefore overlooked the very considerable differences between countries and epochs; I did not attempt to explain the variations in the frequency of duelling or the particular emphases which different periods placed upon the constituents of honour, religious, political, financial or sexual. However, such variations are also found within the culture of a single region and epoch and, while this has sometimes been taken to reflect differences between classes or factions in their struggles to impose their own evalua-

tions upon their society,[27] it must be pointed out that this is not merely due to the emergence of new social forces which require the rules to be altered, as it were, if they are to gain power, but to the fact that different elements of a society behave in different ways and think in different ways, albeit within the framework of a common language.

A system of values is never a homogeneous code of abstract principles obeyed by all the participants in a given culture and able to be extracted from an informant with the aid of a set of hypothetical questions, but a collection of concepts which are related to one another and applied differentially by the different status-groups defined by age, sex, class, occupation, etc. in the different social (not merely linguistic) contexts in which they find their meanings. Like tropical fish whose radiant colours fade once they are taken from the water, the concepts which compose such a system retain their exact significance only within the environment of the society which nurtures them and which resolves, thanks to its internal structuring, their conflicts with each other. The variations in the components of the notion of honour in Andalusia reflect, in this way, the articulation of the social structure, and can only be studied in terms of it. This is what we shall now try to do.

Honour and Social Status in Andalusia

A certain bashfulness disguises the expression of attitudes concerning honour in our own society (perhaps because the word has acquired archaic overtones), but this is not so in the small town in the Sierra de Cádiz where I first investigated this theme.[1] Here questions of honour can be debated without causing embarrassment, and they loom large both in theoretical discussions regarding the proprietory of conduct and also in the daiiy idiom of social intercourse: indeed, the honourable status of the members of the community is a matter of continual comment. Reputation is not only a matter of pride, but also of practical utility. Where free associations of a contractual kind govern the forms of co-operation and enterprise, a good name is the most valuable of assets. Moreover, the honour of a man has a legal status in Spanish, which it does not have in Anglo-Saxon, law.[2] The value attached to honour can also be seen in the custom of bargaining where intermediaries, reminiscent of seconds in a

duel, are required for the successful negotiation. Attempts to damage reputation are constantly made and every quarrel which gains flame leads to imputations of acts and intentions which are totally dishonourable and which may well have nothing to do with the subject of the quarrel. The discussions of honour are not restricted to literal expression; circumlocutions are frequently used and the reputation of a person is more commonly attained by implications than by direct statements.

The girl who discussed in literal terms whether or not it was dishonouring to recognize one's own nickname[3] was in no way exceptional in her preoccupation to reach a clear distinction between the conduct which dishonoured and that which did not, though in maintaining that she could without dishonour respond when it was mentioned in the street, she was going counter to the general opinion of the community. She herself admitted that it depended upon the nature of the nickname, since, while some nicknames, such as hers, derive from the surname of an ancestor or from a place of origin, others are unflatteringly personal. I put her thesis to the test when challenged one dark night upon the road and earned, first of all some astonished comments that I should announce myself as 'the Englishman', and when I asked why I should not do so, a homily on 'how we behave here'. The customs of the bullring and the music-hall whose heroes present themselves under the rubric of their nickname are not those of the *pueblo*. I had, in any case, overstated her thesis, for the girl denied that she would go so far as to announce herself by her nickname, and she held more conventional views regarding the other ways in which honour could be forfeited. These, as she saw them, were concerned entirely with the possibility of imputing an improper relationship with a member of the male sex.

Criticizing people behind their back is one thing and treating them with contempt to their face is quite another. This society lays great emphasis on courtesy, and when people have quarrelled to the point that they are not prepared to behave with courtesy to one another, then they avoid entering each other's presence; it is recognized that the two 'do not speak', and others connive in avoiding situations where they might be forced to do so. There is, however, a certain class of person to whom courtesy is commonly denied, the 'shameless ones' (*los sin vergüenza*). These are

people whose dishonourable reputation is established beyond all doubt through their habitual indulgence in conduct which is shameful: petty thieving, begging and promiscuity in the case of women. They are considered to be outside the moral pale, and, in this way, are associated with the gypsies who are thought to be, by nature, devoid of shame. Such persons are often addressed directly by their nickname without the Christian name and treated with open disdain (though fear of the magical power of gypsies usually affords them a certain respect from the unsophisticated). The fact that these people are prepared to put up with such treatment confirms their status as shameless.

The mores of Andalusia, like those of peasant Greece[4] are indulgent towards conduct which we might regard as boastful, and the example is not lacking of one, Manuel 'el Conde', who, even by their light, was regarded as somewhat overbearing. A man of short stature and unimposing physique, he was a recognized agricultural expert (*perito*), that is to say, one whose opinion could be called upon by the syndical organization. His opinion was given in fact, in not unforceful terms, upon any occasion when he thought it relevant. He was accustomed to boast of his ugliness, as though it were an embellishment to his other qualities, and to stake his claim to honour without quibbling:

'I have not much fortune,' he would say, and then, tapping his breast, 'but I have within me that which is worth more than fortune, my honour.'

He was also fond of interjecting a pun into the conversation when the subject of partridges was mentioned:

'La perdí' dice Usted? No, señor, no la perdí!'
('The partridge, you say? No, sir, I have not lost it!')

That which he has not lost is his shame, for it is common practice to allude to this word by the pronoun without pronouncing it; to 'lose it' means to lose one's shame.

From Manuel's vainglorious pronouncements two points are to be gleaned: first, the close association between the notions of honour and shame, which appear synonymous in many contexts as in these, and secondly, that this quality, once lost, is irrecoverable.

The word which I have translated as 'shame' is *vergüenza*, but it both carries a heavier emphasis and covers a wider range of

meaning than the English equivalent. In a previous discussion of the subject[5] I have defined it as a concern for repute, both as a sentiment and also as the public recognition of that sentiment. It is what makes a person sensitive to the pressure exerted by public opinion. In these senses it is synonymous with honour, but the sentiment also finds expression in ways which are no longer so, such as shyness, blushing and the restraints which derive from emotional inhibition, the fear of exposing oneself to comment and criticism.

As the basis of repute, honour and shame are synonymous, since shamelessness is dishonourable; a person of good repute is taken to have both, one of evil repute is credited with neither. (This is so at least at the plebeian level which is all we are concerned with for the moment.) As such, they are the constituents of virtue. Yet while certain virtues are common to both sexes, such as honesty, loyalty, a concern for reputation which involves avoidance of moral turpitude in general, they are not all so. For the conduct which establishes repute depends upon the status of the person referred to. This is particularly evident in the differentiation of the sexes. The honour of a man and of a woman therefore imply quite different modes of conduct. This is so in any society.[6] A woman is dishonoured, loses her *vergüenza*, with the tainting of her sexual purity, but a man does not. While certain conduct is honourable for both sexes, honour=shame requires conduct in other spheres, which is exclusively a virtue of one sex or the other. It obliges a man to defend his honour and that of his family, a woman to conserve her purity. Yet the concepts of honour and shame also extend to the point where they are no longer synonymous, and at this point they lose their ethical value. Shame, no longer equivalent to honour, as shyness, blushing and timidity is thought to be proper to women, even though it no longer constitutes virtue, while honour, no longer equivalent to shame, becomes an exclusively male attribute as the concern for precedence and the willingness to offend another man. At this point also these modes of conduct become dishonouring for the inappropriate sex: for a man, to show timidity or blush is likely to make him an object of ridicule, while a woman who takes to physical violence or attempts to usurp the male prerogative of authority or, very much more so, sexual freedom, forfeits her shame. Thus honour and shame, when they are not

equivalent, are linked exclusively to one sex or the other and are opposed to one another.

There is however one further usage of the word *vergüenza* which is common to both sexes and this is in the sense of 'to put to shame', literally 'to give shame' (*darle vergüenza*), or speaking about oneself, to feel shame, literally, 'to be given it'. It derives from the concern for repute, since one who is thus concerned is more easily put to shame than one who is not, but it is, so to speak, its negative counterpart. A person who *has vergüenza* is sensitive to his repute and therefore honourable, but if he *is given it*, he is humiliated, stripped of honour. By implication, if he had it already he would not have to be given it; and this is made clear in the usage of *darle vergüenza* to mean: to punish a child. A person who possesses *vergüenza* already does not expose himself to the risk of humiliation. In accordance with the general structure of the notion of honour explained in the first part of this essay, he is shamed (*avergonzado*) only at the point when he is forced to recognize that he has accepted humiliation. In this sense, as that which is not inherent in the person but is imposed from outside, shame is equivalent to dishonour. This explains the usage in the law of an earlier period (of which Caro Baroja speaks) of the punishment of *vergüenza pública*, the public dishonouring. Honour is the aspiration to status and the validation of status, while *vergüenza*, opposed to honour, is the restraint of such an aspiration (timidity) and also the recognition of the loss of status. Thus, just as honour is at the same time honour felt, honour claimed and honour paid, so *vergüenza* is dishonour imposed, accepted and finally felt. Honour originates in the individual breast and comes to triumph in the social realm, *vergüenza* in this sense originates in the actions of others as the denial of honour, and is borne home in the individual. The concepts of honour or shame are therefore either, according to context, synonymous as virtue or contraries as precedence or humiliation.

We might express the relationship between the two concepts in a diagram (*see overleaf*).

It will be noted that the ethically neutral qualities which are exclusively honour or shame are at the same time necessary ingredients of the qualities, linked to one sex or the other, which are ethically valued and are equivalent to both honour and shame.

NB All the terms shown on this chart are either translations from the Spanish of the pueblo or summaries which represent recognized categories of behaviour, expressed in the evaluations which people make in the course of living. Thus, while 'manliness' is a literal translation of *hombría*, 'concern for repute' is derived from statements regarding *fama* and equally from expressions of concern regarding the *quedirán*, critical gossip. Female sexual purity is expressed by either *honra* or *vergüenza*. The implication of honourability or shamelessness associated with such statements is also made clear in a great variety of ways which include gesture. An established vocabulary of gesture exists in order to convey the meanings: 'hard face' (*cara dura*), which is a way of saying shameless, financial dishonesty, homosexuality, cuckoldry; and of course that great desecratory gesture known as the *corte de manga* (cut of the sleeve) is used to dishonour another man entirely.

This is so because they derive from natural qualities. Thus restraint is the natural basis of sexual purity, just as masculinity is the natural basis of authority and the defence of familial honour. The ideal of the honourable man is expressed by the word *hombría*, 'manliness'. It subsumes both shame and masculinity, yet it is possible to possess masculinity without shame as well, for which reason it is placed under the title of ethical neutrality. Masculinity means courage whether it is employed for moral or immoral ends. It is a term which is constantly heard in the *pueblo*, and the concept is expressed as the physical sexual quintessence of the male (*cojones*). The contrary notion is conveyed by the adjective *manso* which means both tame and also castrated. Lacking the physiological basis, the weaker sex cannot obviously be expected to possess it, and it is excluded from the demands of female honour. On the other hand, female honour is not entirely without a physiological basis also (although this is not expressed with the same linguistic clarity), in that sexual purity relates to the maidenhead. The male, therefore, both lacks the physiological basis of sexual purity and risks the implication that his masculinity is in doubt if he maintains it; it comes to mean for him, despite the teachings of religion, an, as it were, self-imposed tameness=castration, and is therefore excluded from the popular concept of male honour. The natural qualities of sexual potency or purity and the moral qualities associated with them provide the conceptual framework on which the system is constructed.

This division of labour in the aspects of honour corresponds, as the reader would guess, to the division of roles within the nuclear family. It delegates the virtue expressed in sexual purity to the females and the duty of defending female virtue to the males. The honour of a man is involved therefore in the sexual purity of his mother, wife and daughters, and sisters, not in his own. *La mujer honrada, la pierna quebrada y en casa* (the honourable woman: locked in the house with a broken leg), the ancient and still popular saying goes, indicating the difficulties which male honour faces in this connection, for once the responsibility in this matter has been delegated, the woman remains with her own responsibility alleviated. The frailty of women is the inevitable correlate of this conceptualization,[7] and the notion is not, perhaps, displeasing to the male who may see in it an

encouragement for his hopes of sexual conquest. Thus, an honourable woman, born with the proper sentiment of shame strives to avoid the human contacts which might expose her to dishonour; she cannot be expected to succeed in this ambition, unsupported by male authority. This fact gives justification to the usage which makes the deceived husband, not the adulterer, the object of ridicule and opprobrium according to the customs of southern Europe (and formerly, England and the whole of Europe).

I have described the symbolism of cuckoldry previously[8] which I summarize now as follows: the cuckold, *cabrón*, literally the billy-goat, is said to 'have horns'. The horns, a phallic symbol, are also the insignia of the Devil, the enemy of virtue, whose associates possess other symbols of a phallic nature, such as the broomstick upon which witches ride. Yet male sexuality is essential to the foundation of the family, as well as necessary, in its associated aspect as courage, to its defence. As well as potentially evil, it is also, when combined with shame as manliness, good. The manliness of a husband must be exerted above all in the defence of the honour of his wife on which his own depends. Therefore her adultery represents not only an infringement of his rights but the demonstration of his failure in his duty. He has betrayed the values of the family, bringing dishonour to all the social groups who are involved reciprocally in his honour: his family and his community. His manliness is defiled, for he has fallen under the domination of the Devil and must wear his symbol as the stigma of his betrayal. The responsibility is his, not the adulterer's, for the latter was only acting in accordance with his male nature. The pander, not the libertine, is the prototype of male dishonour,[9] for the latter may be assumed to defend these values when he is called upon to do so, that is to say, when *his* honour is at stake. The transfer of the horns from the adulterer to the victim of the adultery concords with the moral indeterminacy of the quality of masculinity and the positive value of manliness.

The adulterer may not be regarded as dishonourable – and we shall see that opinions vary in this regard according to social status – but this does not save him from committing a sin in the eyes of the Church. The idea that the punishment for a breach of rights should be visited by custom on the victim not the

perpetrator may still perhaps strike us as anomalous, but this is only if we view this as an instance of a legal mechanism, a punitive sanction, and this is not in fact the framework within which it is to be interpreted.

The code of honour derives, as has been said, from a sacred quality of persons, not from ethical or juridical provisions, and we have seen how in European history it has conflicted with the law of the Church and the law of the land. If we view the adulterer and the cuckold, not in terms of right and wrong, but in terms of sanctity or defilement, we can see why the latter, the defiled one, should be the object of contempt, not the defiler. Through his defilement he becomes ritually dangerous and the horns represent not a punishment but a state of desecration.[10] In contrast, the adulterer is a sinner and, technically, in Spanish law, a criminal.

We have pointed out that where the concepts of shame and honour overlap they are equivalent to virtue, but the ethics of the community are not exhausted by this category. There remain the fields of conduct which contribute little or nothing to reputation but face only the individual conscience which, again, may not respond to all the injunctions of Catholic teaching. It is noteworthy that religion does not define adultery in the same way as urban custom nor the penal code, which exonerates *discreet* male marital infidelity by defining a husband's dalliance as adultery only if it takes place in the conjugal home or with notoriety.

Though the penal code of Spain defines offences against honour, proceedings are instituted only at the demand of the injured party. Other than as an ideological statement, the legal provisions serve also to validate the rights of individuals whose conduct, indicted in other ways, may be justified by reference to their honour. The sanctions which maintain the code of honour in the *pueblo* are popular and are based upon the idea of ridicule, *burla*. *Burla* is the destroyer of reputation, whether it is employed by one individual against another in an act of defiance (as the Burlador de Sevilla employed it against the men and women whom it amused him to dishonour), or as a sanction exercised by the collectivity in the form of public ridicule. I have previously given a description of the institutions which exert the collective sanctions: the giving of a nickname which refers to a specific incident or to a particularity of conduct, the popular ballads,

especially those which were formerly sung by the masked figures of the Carnival, or the institution of the *vito* (elsewhere referred to as the *cencerrada*, the charivari), with its cow-horns, bells, strings of tins, catcalls and obscene songs.

If we examine the incidents which provoked these sanctions we may divide them according to the nature of the transgression. Of the damaging nicknames, a few relate to economic behaviour and a few to sexual behaviour, though the majority ridicule a person on account of a specific incident which appealed to the collective imagination or of a physical or cultural deficiency. Some songs of Carnival publicized acts of dishonesty, but many were concerned with sexual offences and in particular, infidelity to husband or fiancé. The marital misfortunes of shepherds, those 'sailors of the wavy sierras', as Gerald Brenan has called them,[11] whose long spans of absence from the *pueblo* make their wives subject to suspicion, were high among them. The justification given for singing these songs was that it was necessary to warn the husband or prospective husband of the condition of his honour, though the nature of the rhymes themselves show that this duty was undertaken with glee rather than compassion for the victim of such a betrayal. The *vitos* were aimed at publicizing scandalously, and thereby prohibiting, a living scandal.

The folklore has defined the traditional occasion for the charivari as the remarriage of a widowed person. There had once been such a *vito* in the distant past. Since the *vito* is against the law, it no longer takes place within any *pueblo* where there is a detachment of civil guards. There was one more recent case involving a young widow who had gone to live with a widower upon his parent's farm, but the majority of cases recorded, and the most violent ones, were provoked by the action of a man who was not widowed but had abandoned his wife in order to take up with another woman (and such a woman was necessarily shameless in the popular view). He was not, that is to say, a cuckold, but an unfaithful husband. However, the nature of the proceedings and the words of the songs left no doubt that he was endowed with the symbols of the cuckold, and this fact is reinforced by the usage of the *pueblo* which applies to such a person the word *cabrón*, which to the educated means only a cuckold. In the same vein, it is significant that, following the quarrel between Manuel el Conde and the carpenter,[12] the latter should have

attacked his reputation by saying that he was cruel to his daughter, his only child, and that he intended to abandon his wife and go off with another woman, not that *his wife* had unfaithful intentions.

It would appear then that the theory of cuckoldry which we have outlined requires further explanation in order to cover this extended sense. This can be given without doing violence to that already offered.

To begin with, the *vito* is concerned uniquely with the behaviour of married persons. For the plebeians, in contrast to the middle classes, the rites of the Church are not essential to marriage and many common law marriages exist. The Anarchist movement which formerly had great influence here rejected all religious teaching and ceremonies, and in spite of a certain amount of proselytizing by the Catholic Action committee, the poorer people very often do not marry until they have a child. Therefore when unmarried people set up house together they are regarded as a young married couple by the community, and it is in fact quite likely that they will get married within a year or two. On the other hand if a person who is already considered to be married goes to live with another, not his spouse, this is, by the same logic, equivalent to bigamy, since the fact of cohabitation rather than the Church rite is the criterion of marriage.

It is accepted that young people who face opposition to their marriage from the girl's father may force the father's hand by running away to spend the night together. After this, their recognition as a married couple, their marriage for preference, is the only way in which his honour can be retrieved. There were no fewer than six such escapades during a single year. But in one of these cases the father failed to react in the expected fashion. His daughter was a minor and had fine prospects of inheritance since he was a well-to-do farmer. The young man had been employed upon the farm and hoped, so it was thought, to become through marriage its heir. The father's immediate reaction, in this case, was to have him arrested and thrown into jail on the charge of violation of a minor.

In no instance recorded in this town was the *vito* put on for a married woman who had left her husband to live with another man, though there have been cases elsewhere. It seems most improbable in a town of this size, three thousand inhabitants, that

such a couple would remain in the place. Women who 'go off the rails' go off them elsewhere, and thereby they justify the countryman's cherished belief in the iniquity of the city. There are, nevertheless, a number of unmarried or abandoned mothers who remain in the *pueblo* with their family.[13] Their disgrace is clearly recognized, but they are not treated as shameless. Their status is somewhat similar to that of a young widow. Their prospects of remarriage are very poor, since the man who wished to marry such a girl would be dishonoured – honour requires that one marry a virgin, since otherwise one becomes a retroactive cuckold – yet if their conduct gives no cause for scandal, they are distinguished from the loose women who come within the category of the shameless and who are sometimes designated by the word *deshonradas*, dishonoured.

It is said that the *vito* would formerly have been put on for any marital infidelity in the *pueblo*, though in fact the transient adventure and the discreetly-conducted affair always appear to have escaped. This may be due, in part, to reasons of practical organization: the assemblage of young men with the equipment of horns and cowbells and the composition of the songs, all take time – and the *vito* must catch the couple together. Unlike the songs of Carnival which recount past events, the *vito* cannot relate to what is no longer happening.

There are however two categories of person who escape the *vito* altogether. These are the shameless ones and the *señoritos*, the upper class of the town. The shameless escape for the obvious reason that people who have no honour cannot be stripped of it. The *señoritos* escape because they are not part of the plebeian community, and their actions do not therefore affront its standards of conduct in the same way. It is recognized that they are different. The elderly lawyer who maintained a widow as his mistress was not thought to be a candidate for the *vito*, even though her daughter was also subsequently credited with that title, nor was a *vito* ever put on for the sake of that rich man who took as mistress the wife of a plebeian, though the latter was celebrated by the nickname of 'the horn of gold'. The *señoritos* did not, however, escape mention in the popular ballads. Given that the desecration symbolized by the horns relates to the dishonour of a man through his failure as a defender of his family, it follows that this carries different implications whether

he is plebeian or *señorito*. The upper class husband can maintain two establishments and divide his time between them, but this is not possible for the plebeian who has neither the time nor the resources; if he takes a mistress to live with him this can only mean a rejection of his family. Therefore the word *cabrón* carries a different connotation in the plebeian community; the implications of conduct are different. The plebeian adulterer desecrates his family by taking a mistress, the *señorito* demonstrates his superior masculinity by doing so. In fact it is common to find men of the wealthier class in the cities who maintain a second household, and though this is resented by their wives, they are not subject to general opprobrium. This was not found in any of the towns where I studied, all of them of a few thousand inhabitants only. Nevertheless the case was reported to me, from a town of no more than sixteen thousand inhabitants, of a man of wealth and high consideration who, childless in his marriage, maintained no fewer than three illegitimate families within the precincts of the town. His relations with these households were conducted with great discretion, though the facts were widely known, and he was never seen entering the house of one of his mistresses during the daytime. He gave his numerous sons a professional education and for this reason was regarded as a very good father and a good man.

The association of male honour with the family and the qualities necessary to defend it, rather than with the morality, religious or not, of sexual conduct does not mean that the latter has no hold upon the men of Andalusia. Yet it is curious that this aspect of Christian morality is given more weight by the plebeians (who are mostly anti-clerical and rather irreligious), than by the middle and upper classes who are pillars of the Church and often profoundly religious. There is, in fact, a plebeian preoccupation with the notion of vice which is freely applied to any form of sensual over-indulgence, in particular women and wine, and this is thought of as something approaching a monopoly of the outside world and of the rich who maintain connections with it. This view of 'vice' expresses a social reality: it is only possible to escape the sanctions of popular opinion by going away. The shame which is bound up with the collective honour of the *pueblo* is juxtaposed to the shamelessness of the cities, since vice implies shamelessness. Such a view also implies that the rich are

shameless, and this is quite often said. This conception of honour, associated with shame as we have seen, is similar to that of the Christian moralists whose criticism of the code of honour has been mentioned. Indeed, and in more ways than in this, the views of the *pueblo* echo those of the moralists of an earlier age.

I have defined shame in its social aspect as a sensitivity to the opinion of others and this includes, even for the *señoritos*, a consciousness of the public opinion and judgement of the whole community. One finds therefore a rather different attitude towards sexual promiscuity among the *señoritos* of the small town than among those of the cities, an attitude which expresses itself in the idea that male marital infidelity is dishonourable because it is an act of disrespect towards the wife. The husband who respects his wife is not promiscuous. I have the impression that this notion is less important in more sophisticated places.

Yet if the judgement of the *pueblo* brings its weight to bear upon the mores of its upper class, it is equally true that the influences of the outside world pervade the *pueblo*. Moreover, the 'puritanism' of the *pueblo* does not suffice to obliterate a consciousness of the value of sexual conquest as a justification of masculinity. A conflict of values is therefore implicit between the male pride which expresses itself in gallantry towards the female sex, and that which reposes upon a firm attachment to the duties of the family man. Manuel el Conde, the protagonist of honour, furnishes an illustration. At a fiesta held in the valley one of the local belles walked past him with her head high, ignoring his presence. Manuel was piqued.

'If it were not,' he said, 'for the ring upon this finger, I would not let that girl pass by me as she has.' Manuel thus recoups upon the hypothetical level the masculinity which he sacrifices in reality to his familial honour. He eats his cake and has it, albeit in fantasy.

There is another way in which plebeian honour departs from that of the upper classes. Honour is an hereditary quality; the shame of the mother is transmitted to the children and a person's lack of it may be attributed to his birth, hence the power of the insults, the most powerful of all, which relate to the purity of the mother. After this, the greatest dishonour of a man derives from the impurity of his wife. On the other hand, if his own conduct is recognized as dishonourable, then the honour of his family has

no protector. Therefore, in its aspect as equivalent to shame, the nuclear family shares a common honour. The children not only inherit their shame, their own actions reflect upon that of their parents. The purity of the daughter reflects that of her mother, and thereby, the honour of her father. Her brothers, participants in a common heritage, are equally attainted by the dishonour of any member of their elementary family.

Social status is inherited primarily from the father whose patrilineal first surname a son inherits and will transmit to his descendants. The economic status of the family depends upon the father's ability to maintain or to improve its wealth. Therefore, in its aspect as right to precedence, honour derives predominantly from the father, whereas in its aspect of shame it derives predominantly from the mother. The distinction concords with the fact that precedence is something which can be gained through action – male enterprise, whereas shame cannot be gained, can only be maintained through avoiding the conduct which would destroy it – female restraint. An earlier period of Spanish history conceptualized these notions with more clarity than today as we learn from Caro Baroja's discussion of the descent of rank and purity of blood, concepts which represent quite clearly the notions of honour as precedence, and shame, respectively.[14]

The *pueblo* is envisaged as a community of equals amongst whom economic differences do not amount to differences of social class, even though they are considerable. All address their agemates in the second person, even the employee his plebeian employer. From this community the *señoritos* are excluded; they are accorded, as a title of respect, the prefix 'Don' to their Christian name which indicates their superior status, in contrast to the title 'Señor' which is given to the respected members of the *pueblo* who have reached the age of retirement. The status of respected elder in a community of conceptual equals is as high as any member of the *pueblo* can normally aspire. Such positions of authority as exist between members of the *pueblo* derive from power delegated from the upper classes in a particular post, not from the quality of the person. Therefore there are no occasions when an order of precedence is ever required. The rule of 'first come, first served' governs all the contexts of ordering persons whether in the market or at the town-hall. This is not so among

the *señoritos* who possess a concept of social status which differentiates them from the plebeians and involves an order of ranking, however unclear the ranking order may be, and however loath they are to make it explicit in their treatment of their fellows. There are, nevertheless, degrees of deference paid according to their relative status even in the context of the *pueblo*, and there is at least one family which conserves documents from the eighteenth century to prove its superior origins. Though they mix freely in everyday life, occasions arise when it is necessary to separate the sheep from the goats, and persons whose claim to status is well-established from those whose claim is less secure: the reunions with the summer visitors (who are persons of superior status to any in the *pueblo*), the visit of an important outsider or the marriage of a daughter of a leading family. On all these occasions personal attachments to the host cut across any objective criterion of ranking, yet the ranking is clearly implied.

A situation when a stratified order of precedence was required occurred when the image of Our Lady of Fatima visited the town and places were reserved in the church for the leading citizens and their wives. This gave rise to disputes, and for understandable reasons. First of all, seating in the church is normally quite informal and irregular; the men separate from the women and stand at the back, if indeed they attend the same mass as their wives. Other religious fiestas are organized by the church brotherhood of the particular cult, but there is no value attached to the order in which a procession is followed, and *señoritos* and plebeians attend in a haphazard manner. There was no precedent which could be followed in the order of seating. On this occasion, it was decided that, since the church was likely to be overcrowded, seats would be reserved. Proximity to the image therefore became a criterion of precedence in an entirely novel setting. But how was it to be accorded? The question of precedence could not be decided by the mayor on the basis of official posts, as on the occasion of the governor's visit, since the privileged were to include more than the officials and his authority was irrelevant since this was a religious occasion. The reception committee which had been specially formed for the event possessed no authority to enforce their ruling, and the priest wisely preferred to have nothing to do with such details. As a result, many felt

that they had not been given the honour which was their due, and a series of quarrels ensued regarding their placing, which conflicted with the spirit of the occasion.

The nearer we move to the centre of national society and the higher in the hierarchy of status, the greater the importance of precedence, since the greater the number of contexts in which it is required and the greater the need for criteria by which it may be established. It follows therefore that the importance of honour=precedence increases with social status until we reach the aristocracy and the members of official organizations whose precedence is regulated by protocol, and among whom the concern for precedence is increasingly vital.

In the *pueblo* the ideal of equality in honour reigns and precedence deriving from birth and associated with status is missing. When conflicts threaten, the personal attribute of masculinity comes to the fore to determine the pre-eminence of one man over another and the word *cojones* is heard. It is a term which expresses unqualified admiration for the protagonist, quite regardless whether his behaviour is from other points of view admirable. It is to be noted that it is seldom used or understood in the literal sense.[15]

Physical violence is not thought to be a legitimate way to attain one's ends, yet when his rights are infringed, a man is forced to stand up for himself under pain of appearing a coward. So when violence occurs, it is characteristic that both parties believe themselves to be on the defensive, merely protecting their rightful pride. On festive occasions it is expected that people will forget their animosities and meet in a spirit of amity. Nevertheless, much wine is drunk then and fighting not uncommonly occurs among the young men, not so much as a defence of rights but as an expression of rivalry. Such an incident took place at a fiesta in the valley on the eve of St John. It was attended by the sons of El Cateto and also by those of La Castaña against whom the former had an antipathy of long standing. Before the end of the evening, Juan el Cateto was declaiming that he had more masculinity than all the Castaños put together. In the fight which ensued between the male youth of the two families, no damage was done since the combatants were on the whole more drunk than the public to whom it fell to hold back the assailants. Such incidents serve to show how the struggle for prestige is

subdued in daily life by the conception of a community of equals which ordains that a man may not humiliate another. It is not dishonouring to avoid a person with whom one has quarrelled, but on the occasion of a fiesta each is entitled to think that it is the duty of the other to avoid him. This view of the town as a community of honourable men concords with the notion, expressed in the Fuero de los Españoles, that every individual has the right to honour. The competition for prestige finds its limits in the obligation to respect the pride of others, and this is true at any level of the social structure. Both the Catetos and the Castaños were criticized for their 'ugly' behaviour which spoiled the fiesta. There is no conception of sportsmanship which permits men to accept humiliation with dignity or to inflict it rightfully within the limits of a defined context. The existence of the sport of boxing in other countries and in Madrid, which is known thanks to the newspapers, is regarded as proof of the barbarity of foreigners and the corruption of the great city.

The collective honour of the *pueblo* is expressed in rivalry between *pueblos* which furnishes a body of rhymes in which each is epitomized by its neighbours in the most disobliging terms, implying dishonour in a rich variety of ways of which the most outspoken concern the purity of their women. The collections of folklore abound in examples. This collective honour is not usually expressed, however, in a hostile attitude towards individual outsiders. The individual stranger presents on the contrary an occasion to demonstrate the honourability of the *pueblo*, and every member becomes potentially a bearer of its honour. How the visitor is received depends upon the context in which he confronts the community. If he is recognized as a person of status, if he comes alone and with friendly intent it is important that he be received in accordance with the principle of hospitality towards strangers; they alone can validate the collective image. Yet in order to do so the visitor must be a person worthy of respect. The higher his status, the more important it is that he be favourably impressed, for he does honour to the *pueblo* by coming. It is above all to the visitor of the *señorito* class that the traditional courtesies of Andalusia are shown. The plebeian visitor still requires to be favourably impressed but more suspicion attaches to his visit. He may have come for reasons which do the *pueblo* no honour; those who come to seek work are potential blacklegs;

those who come for commercial reasons may have come to cheat. Both have come seeking their own interest and while they should be favourably impressed, they should also be watched. Boys who come from neighbouring towns to court a girl are treated traditionally with hostility, if not actually with violence, by the young men of the *pueblo* whose collective honour is challenged by their presence.

Visitors who come in large numbers during the fiesta offer a problem; by swelling the attendance at the fiesta they do the *pueblo* honour, for the number of people who attend gives a measure to its importance, yet it may transpire that they have come with the intention of inflicting humiliation. A visiting football team, for example, does honour only so long as it is defeated, but if it wins it inflicts humiliation. If it succeeds in imposing its superiority, then it is liable to be resisted as in Ubrique where the *pueblo* defended their honour against humiliation by a more expert team from Cortes de la Frontera which scored two goals in the first five minutes, yet failed to win the match. Unprepared to submit to such treatment, the infuriated public drove the visitors off the field and out of the town in a hailstorm of stones, and their bus was sent after them to pick them up and take them away.

In all situations of challenge a man's honour is what obliges him to respond by resenting the affront, yet a challenge is something which can only be given by a conceptual equal; the force of an affront lies in the fact that it is an attempt to establish superiority over the affronted person. If this is not the case then there is no challenge. This may be demonstrated by a fact that appeared to me at first sight curious. The farm of Pegujál has an only son and he is mentally deranged. He lives there with his widowed mother and keeps a small flock of sheep. These he takes out to pasture wherever he wishes, often beyond the frontiers of his land, in disregard of the land rights of the valley. The owners or lessees of pasture may find him any day encroaching upon their property, and if any reproach is made to him he merely utters oaths and throws rocks. Encroachment upon pasture is one of the causes of quarrels in which the honour of both parties becomes involved, but in this case it is not so. His lunacy places him outside the community of normal men and he is therefore unable to affront. People take no direct steps to

restrain him and, if he turns up on their land, they shrug their shoulders. His actions cannot constitute a challenge, since he is mad.

Equally, if there is already a difference in social status between the two parties, then actions which might otherwise be an affront cease to be so. The man who has the right to authority over others does not affront them in exercising that right. It is not humiliating to obey the commands of a person entitled to give them. This fact is crucial to understanding how honour is effective in relations within the hierarchy of this society. To receive protection from someone not recognized as a superior is humiliating, but from the moment that protection is accepted superiority is admitted, and it is no longer humiliating to serve such a person. Service and protection are the reciprocal links which hold a system of patronage together. At the same time the patron increases his prestige through the possession of clients, while the client participates in the glory of his patron. The two are linked together by a personal tie which gives each diffuse rights over the other: service when it is required, assistance when it is needed. The system is reinforced through the institution of ritual kinship and expressed in its idiom. The terms *padrino*, *apadrinar*, *compadre* (godfather, to sponsor, co-parent) have extensions far beyond the literal sense. *El que tiene padrinos se bautiza*, the saying goes. (He who has godparents gets baptized.) In the struggle for life success depends in reality upon the ability, much less to defend one's rights against equals, than to attract the favour of the powerful.

The social class of the *señoritos* is defined by their way of life, but their prestige relates to their ability to operate a system of tacit reciprocities: to possess clients who owe them fidelity and respect, *compadres* with whom to exchange favours, and equally, patrons of whom they in their turn can demand favours, not only for themselves but for their clients. Thus they build up the reputation for beneficence which is an aspect of honour. Beneficence therefore transforms economic power into honour. Let us see, therefore, how the notion of honour relates to money.

Financial honesty (*honradez*) is associated with honour in the sense that it is dishonourable to defraud. Yet the circumstances need to be defined since to outwit is permissible, even mandatory in the context of bargaining. As one well-qualified to judge once

warned me, 'In your country it may be different but here a bargain is not a bargain unless you have told forty lies.' Rather than a matter of abstract principle, the obligation to deal honestly is, in fact, a personal one. You owe honesty in defined situations, as loyalty to a particular person. To persons with whom you have or wish to form ties, to kin, friends, or to employers, particularly if they are also godparents; to abstract entities such as limited companies less, and to the state not at all, since these latter categories, not being persons, cannot offer the reciprocity required in the system of patronage. Within the community of the *pueblo* there is an obligation to honour one's undertakings, and complaints about those who have failed to do so both stress this as a norm of conduct and also demonstrate that it is not always obeyed. In fact, men learn whom they can trust little by little, testing each other as they go along. In the case of default they have at least recourse to the tribunal of public opinion before whom they can impugn the reputation of the other, as well as the more cumbrous and distrusted mechanisms of the law. The tribunal of public opinion is not of much use when dealing with people from another town or from the city, and the law is less effective also, so the distrust towards outsiders seems sensible enough. For the same reason the outsider has less control over the sanctions which enforce honesty towards him.

There is a tendency to presume upon the favour of a patron when he is the employer, and servants and bailiffs frequently regard it as their due to take financial advantage of their situation. For these reasons the absentee landowner, even though he turns up at harvest time, seldom avoids being cheated. *El ojo del amo engorda el caballo.* (It is the eye of the master which fattens the horse.) Moreover, persons of high social status tend to be lenient towards the peccadillos of their trusted employees as long as they 'don't go too far'. To be penny-pinching does not go with the ideal of aristocratic behaviour.

The ability to pay is an essential part of honorific behaviour, whether in the context of hospitality towards strangers, or in asserting pre-eminence among equals or bestowing protection upon inferiors. Paying is a privilege which goes to the man of precedence since to be paid for places a man in a situation of inferiority. Hence disputes about paying the bill which occur whenever there is no clearly defined superior who can claim the

right to do so. (In such a situation a man must put up a good fight in order to defend his honour even though he may be delighted to lose.) There are barmen in establishments frequented by gentlemen of honour who have amassed a tidy fortune simply by giving way to all those who claimed the privilege of paying. The humiliation of being paid for is still very real, even though it may no longer go so far as in the days of George Borrow who tells of a nobleman who ran his friend through with his sword at the end of a drinking-bout, because the latter insisted on footing the bill.

The show of beneficence forbids one to appear grasping or concerned with money. Yet on the other hand, the man who takes no care to preserve or augment his resources may lack the wherewithal to validate his honour on the morrow. There are many spendthrifts in the cities to whom the attraction of honorific behaviour in the present outweighs their concern for the future. Such people are often more involved in display and competition with equals than in meeting their obligation to dependents.

There is no subject upon which more contradictory opinions have been put forward than 'the Spanish attitude to money'. They range from Don Ramón Menendez Pidal's assertion that 'it is a natural trait in the Spaniard not to allow any calculation of gains and losses to prevail over considerations of another order',[16] to the sly jibe of Cortés that he and his companions suffered from a disease of the heart which could be cured only with gold. Foreign observers have brought their testimony to bear at both extremes, some praising the disinterestedness of the Spanish character, others, perpetrators of the Black Legend in the Spanish view, asserting the opposite. Such a contradiction can only be reconciled through an appeal to context. By translating the ideal of beneficence into the reality of behaviour we can see that it implies a concern in acquisition, on the one hand, with a view to gaining honour through disposing generously of that which has been acquired, on the other. To give a thing away one must first of all get hold of it. The same concern is acquiring honour, through the act of beneficence rather than, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries, through the fact of possession, explains these extreme views. For honour derives from the domination of persons, rather than things, and this is the goal which distinguishes the acquisitive values of Andalusia. It is, needless to say, a goal which is inimical to capitalist accumulation.

The concept of honour presents itself in a different contextual framework to the individual according to his place in the social structure, and the differing value attached to it can be explained by this. Its relation to economic and political power is not seen in the same light by those who possess such power and by those who do not. Those who have no possibility of playing the role of patron do not compete with their equals in the same terms, while their prestige relates, as we have seen, to a public opinion which recognizes virtue rather than precedence as the basis of honour.

At the same time their lives are circumscribed by a community which is a territorial unit and proximity makes the moral sanctions of the *pueblo* effective. This is not the case with the upper classes whose social superiority places their honour in a sheltered position with regard to those sanctions. Their effectiveness varies with the size of the community, so that a distinction must be made not only between different classes but also between the community of a few thousand souls in which public opinion represents a homogeneous body of knowledge and comes to bear upon every member, and those where only the eminent are known to everyone. The urban parish possesses a certain social identity, a network of neighbourly relations through which social control is exerted which likens it to a limited extent to a rural community,[17] yet the possibility of a relative anonymity is open to the man who moves from one district to another, and the force of public opinion is diminished when it is no longer omniscient. The diminished concern with the ethical aspect of honour in the large towns must surely be related to this fact.

The situation of the *señoritos* is also different in the two environments. In the *pueblo* they form a small group who meet each other every day and whose every action is common knowledge to the entire community. They constitute its upper class. In the city this is no longer the case; people of equivalent occupation and wealth form a middle, not an upper, class, and they accept the leadership of persons of greater wealth and wider horizons. They are therefore simultaneously less subject to the sanctions of the *pueblo* and more subject to the influence of the upper class. The

señoritos of the small town appear fine figures at home, but when they come into the city, they shrink in stature, and seem no more than the uncouth country cousins of the urban middle class. *Señorito de pueblo* is a term of denigration in the mouths of city folk.

We must consider the honour of the aristocracy. The Andalusian aristocracy is largely dependent upon landed estates in whose administration they take a varying interest. They maintain their ancient palaces in the cities of Andalusia though many spend much of their time in Madrid. They form the nucleus of so-called 'society' which includes persons of wealth or eminence who do not belong by birth to the aristocracy. This is what I refer to as the upper class. While its various elements mix freely and intermarry, a fundamental prestige attaches to birth which modifies, but does not obliterate, consideration of wealth.

The moral sanctions of the *pueblo* have only a limited importance for the middle class and none for the upper. It is no doubt a satisfaction to them to feel that they are appreciated by their dependents and admired by the populace, but their reputation looks to their equals for validation, not to their inferiors. Their lives possess far more privacy than the *pueblo*, and though they appear as public figures, their intimacy is confined to the circles of their dependents and their peer-group. Gossip indeed exists and tends to be relayed over a wide range, so that a person of the upper class possesses a public character, but his social position is a matter of birth and wealth, and it is therefore, in a sense, impregnable to gossip. If he is disliked by his peers he may be avoided, but his honour is very rarely publicly affronted. He is dishonoured only by being ostracized by his social equals.

The sanctions of honour=virtue therefore play a less conspicuous part than in the plebeian milieu, or for that matter in an earlier period of history. Those who have been ostracized have been so because of their political behaviour during the Civil War or their financial unreliability, rather than their sexual behaviour.[18] However, between plebeian and upper class honour there is, in addition to the difference already noted which was seen in the conception of the cuckold, a further difference. A man's sexual honour is attained not only through the purity of his womenfolk but through his commitment to any other woman in whom he has invested his pride. The infidelity of his mistress

leaves him a cuckold also. Thus on one occasion a lady of the upper classes whom gossip had credited with a clandestine lover over a number of years transferred her favours to a fresh admirer. Shortly afterwards her abandoned lover was seen lunching with her husband and the comment was made: 'There go the two cuckolds!' The abandoned lover was equated with the infelicitous husband.

This usage no longer submits to the explanation which I have given of the symbolism of the horns in the plebeian community, that they stigmatize the failure to defend familial obligations. It is here the lover's honour=precedence, not his honour=shame which is at stake for he has no rights over the woman in question. He is humiliated only in that he has lost to another the 'right' to her favours,[19] the title of 'amant de titre'. The fact that this usage does not conform to the definition given above does not invalidate it. The point, precisely, was that the plebeian conception is not the same as that of the educated classes. The difference corresponds to the relative emphasis placed upon honour as deriving from virtue rather than from precedence. If the former meaning is taken as a basis, then this extended sense must be regarded as a figurative form. On the other hand, if the usage of the educated is adopted, as one who fails to assert his sexual claims, then the plebeian usage must be regarded as, in part, figurative. The two senses overlap, but they do not coincide. Both must be regarded as figurative from the point of view of the brief definition of the *Diccionario de la Academia* quoted above.[20]

The greater sexual freedom of men of the middle classes corresponds to the fact that they are less constrained by the social control of public opinion, due to their greater freedom of movement and material possibilities. But it is also influenced by the fact that, whereas in the plebeian class the woman is the financial administrator of the family – she remains in the *pueblo* when the man goes away to work and therefore she keeps the key to the family chest – in the middle class the woman has relatively less importance in the question of the financial resources of the family, since the husband is not a manual worker but an office worker, rentier, businessman, professional or administrator. She enjoys relatively less liberty of action since she has servants who perform the tasks which take the plebeian housewife out to the

fountain or the market. She is seen in public much less, spends her day in her house, or in visiting hers or her husband's female relatives or in church or occupied by church affairs. Outside her family circle she spends little time in mixed company. Her husband goes alone to the casino or the *tertulia*, the group of friends who meet habitually for conversation. The middle class wife is noticeably more restrained in behaviour than the plebeian, her husband more authoritative and more jealous.

When we reach the upper classes, however, this tendency is reversed, and we find women enjoying much the same independence as in the upper classes of the other countries of Europe. They are subject to less, not more restraint. They smoke and drink in public places frequented by their class, attend social engagements with their husbands, drive automobiles, travel alone and exercise authority in ways which are not allowed the wives of the middle classes. All these activities imply, of course, a higher standard of living. Moreover, gossip credits them with a sexual freedom which is not attributed to the wives of the middle class, and since we are concerned with honour as reputation it is gossip rather than the truth which is relevant. Nevertheless, the number who live separated from their husbands is much greater than among the middle classes, where this is very rare.

If we take the paradigm of plebeian honour and shame shown on page 44 and compare it with the values of the upper class, we can see certain significant variations. Rather than variations in the structure of the concepts, it is a matter of emphases upon their different properties. Thus it appears that shame and honour are less often synonymous with one another. Shame is above all an emotional condition which relates to a given situation in which the individual is put to shame. It can even be experienced vicariously. The word is still used as a personal quality, and one who affronts public opinion is said to have lost it, but self-respect would be a more appropriate translation here; its aspect as hereditary and natural is no longer taken literally. Children are expected to resemble their parents in character, but the shamelessness of one person does not imply that of his family.

Physical courage for the male and unwillingness to accept humiliation for both sexes, are essentials of honour, and financial honesty also, since the contrary implies, apart from everything

else, a base concern in money which is unaristocratic. Honour is a question of class honour and personal precedence rather than sex which dominates the honour of the *pueblo*. Sexual conduct is a matter of conscience and is the subject of religious sanctions. It exposes a person's self-esteem rather than his honour.

Therefore a paradox confronts us which the remainder of this essay will be devoted to clarifying: those whose claim to honour is greatest, and also most dependent upon lineal descent, are most careless of their sexual honour. It is the counterpart, in the sphere of sexual behaviour, of the paradox noted by Voltaire, that there is always least honour to be found surrounding the king. It is far from being particular to Spain; on the contrary, it is perhaps more marked in other countries. However, we shall restrict our consideration of it to the Spanish social scene.

An obvious explanation presents itself: the concept of honour varies from age to age and its importance appears much diminished in modern urban society. The disappearance of the duel in modern times is a testimony of this, though the existence of the duel far from sufficed to make aristocratic honour safe in the eighteenth century, and in the most recent period in which it was prevalent it was not much concerned with the defence of sexual honour.[21] An upper class is always more amenable to foreign influence, and thereby to change, and the ideas of the twentieth century have tended towards, not only a diminution of the concern for honour, but also a greater freedom of action for the married woman. Moreover, there has been a great change in the last three decades in Spain in this regard, not only among the upper class but among the urban middle class. The paradox might be regarded then simply as a fortuitous product of the folk-urban continuum[22]; sexual jealousy is going out of fashion and rustic society is behind the times – an assertion for which there is some evidence, as we shall see. It is also true that the aristocracy is much more subject to foreign influence: English nannies, German Fraüleins, foreign universities and visits to Paris to buy clothes.

However, it appears to me from an admittedly inadequate knowledge of the historical records that the greater independence of women of the aristocracy antedates by a long way the disappearance of the duel and the influence, such as it may have

been, of the movement for the emancipation of women, if indeed it is not rather a permanent feature of aristocratic society.

There is always a tendency to attribute that which one disapproves of to foreign influence and in this, Spanish critics have not been exceptional, whether Don Gregorio Marañon who attributed foreign origins to Don Juan,[23] or, two centuries earlier, Fray Joseph Haro who blamed the custom of the *Chichisveo* (*sic*)[24] on the Italians. Father Haro, writing at the beginning of the Bourbon period was certainly correct in attributing changes in custom to foreign influence. Yet his complaints regarding the looseness of morals, in particular of the upper classes, have a very traditional ring to them. Father Haro understood the word *chichisveo* in a rather different sense to the Italian (where it means simply the person of the *cavalière servente*) as the institution of chivalrous, he thought culpable, friendship between a married person and a member of the opposite sex. His explanation why the rich were the worst offenders was an economic one: that a gentleman is expected to make costly gifts in order to maintain such a friendship. Certain resources are perhaps necessary, but this does not explain why the lady's husband should accept that his wife should receive such an admirer. Economic reasons may be cited to explain why the poor did not indulge in the *chichisveo*, but not why the rich did.

If Father Haro gives a time-depth to the paradox he does not resolve it. There is no doubt that the customs of the aristocracy were changing in the early Bourbon period in this regard. Even though neither the theatre of honour nor the picaresque satires against honour can be taken as literal testimony, they at least indicate a popular preoccupation in the earlier period. Yet the desperation of the aristocratic heroes of the theatre of honour in defending their vulnerability through women implies, unless they are all to be taken as paranoids, that their womenfolk gave them reasons for anxiety. (The fact that the women were often innocent of any infidelity scarcely detracts from the point since that is what makes the plot a tragedy.) The behaviour of the protagonists implies that they were acting according to expectations which, over-optimistic or pessimistic as the case may be, had some foundation in reality: the husband that his wife might be seduced, the gallant that he might succeed in his suit. The existence of

the institution of the Celestina alone implies that the danger to marital honour was a real one. Traffic-lights are not found where there are no automobiles. Lope de Vega's thesis[25] that the only security of a man's honour lies in the virtue of his womenfolk, which appeals to our modern standards by its reasonableness, suggests a new approach to the problem, not that the problem did not exist.

I conclude therefore that this is only partially a modern phenomenon to be attributed to foreign influence and will try to give a more fundamental explanation.

The paradox should be rephrased in accordance with the distinctions already made: the class which possesses by birthright most honour=precedence is most vulnerable in its honour=shame. When we say 'the upper class', we must distinguish between male and female honour, since the carelessness of women relates to their own reputation, while that of men to the steps which they take to cover their vulnerability through women. The obligation for men to avenge their sexual honour is what has varied, above all, from the age in which vengeance is represented as a duty to that in which such acts of vengeance are not only effectively punished by the law but regarded in sophisticated society as barbarous and atavistic. Since the conventions of modern upper class society repudiate any means of responding overtly to such an affront (save through legal action which only aggravates the dishonour by publicizing it), there is little that a man can do about his tarnished honour other than impose the best interpretation of events he can, or cut his losses and renounce his responsibility by an act of separation.

It has already been pointed out that the upper classes are hardly susceptible to plebeian sanctions and the development of modern urban society and the segregation of classes which goes with it makes them even less so. Just as the liar is only dishonoured when, impugned as a liar, he fails to vindicate his honour, so the cuckold is only dishonoured when public recognition is given to the fact that 'the horns have been put on him'. The *pueblo* does this, and the smaller the community the more effectively; the upper class does not. Therefore the situation tends to remain ambiguous and to allow alternative interpretations.

The alternative interpretations which can be placed upon the same behaviour are seen clearly in the ambiguity which surrounded the institution of the *cicisbeo*. The *cavalière servente* appears in the first instance as the guarantor of the husband's honour, who accompanies his wife on occasions when the husband is not able to do so. Since the husband allows it, *honi soit qui mal y pense*. But the sanctioned guarantee becomes, in the eyes of the sceptical, a cover-plan.[26] Whether or not this scepticism is allowed expression depends upon the status of those concerned and the social position of the critic. Father Haro, as a churchman, was in a position to voice his scepticism. In his view, the occasion is all that is needed and 'la carne hace su oficio' (the flesh knows its business); he ridiculed the idea that such a relationship could remain innocent. (He belongs to the school of thought which maintains that female honour is only safe if the lady is locked in with a broken leg.) Yet the idea that women not subjected to male authority are a danger is a fundamental one in the writing of the moralists from the Archpriest of Talavera to Padre Haro, and it is echoed in the modern Andalusian *pueblo*.[27] It is bound up with the fear of ungoverned female sexuality which has been an integral element of European folklore ever since prudent Odysseus lashed himself to the mast to escape the sirens. It is through their sex that women acquire power over men, and 'women have naturally the ambition to attain command and liberty, and they wish to invert the order of nature, attempting (even though it may involve the greatest cruelties) to dominate men'.[28] This then is the traditional way of thinking, but it is no longer that of the educated classes.

However, we must look at it from the woman's point of view. Status derived from birth is not uniquely a male attribute. A woman is granted the status of her husband, but she does not thereby forfeit that which she received by birth. Legally she retains her maiden name, merely adding her husband's to it, and she passes it on to her children as their second surname. Moreover, unlike English titles, Spanish titles pass through the female line in default of a male heir in the same degree of kinship. The result is that they frequently pass through women, changing from one patriline to another. A daughter, in default of sons, bears the title and her husband takes it by courtesy, as her consort. There is no lack of examples in the literature of anthro-

pology of women who take on a social attribute of men, becoming substitutes for them, whether, for example, for the purpose of marrying a wife in the lineage systems of Africa, or of continuing a feud in Montenegro. Yet the point to be retained is that a Spanish woman of high birth is able to transmit her patrilineal status to her children.

Even though woman's shame in the plebeian sense is visualized as a positive attribute, something which can be lost, it cannot be won like precedence, nor is it inherent like status. It is preserved by refraining from actions which are proper to men, and this is possible and necessary, according to the division of labour, because women are under the tutelage of men. Legal independence is a male prerogative, and a woman acquires it only when she leaves the tutelage of her father (until recently at the age of twenty-three). If she has married before then, which is commonly the case, she has already passed under the tutelage of her husband. Had she already acquired legal independence, she would lose it on marriage. Only while she is of age and unmarried, or widowed, is a woman legally independent. Under such circumstances, she does not pass under the authority of her brother or sons, and the division of labour breaks down. She is obliged to take legal responsibility, to act for herself and for her children in legal matters or business, and she must support them; she adopts the social role of a man.

The life expectation of women is higher than that of men and their average age at marriage is some years younger, so that, even discounting the effects of the Civil War, a considerable number of women become widows at an age when they are still active. The Andalusian widow often takes on the duties of her independence with enthusiasm and makes up for the years she has spent in subservience to the male sex.

In the beliefs of the *pueblo*, the same association is made in this case between the male role and aggressive sexual activity, and this is seen in the fact that widows are commonly believed, even in cases of apparent implausibility, to be sexually predatory upon the young men. It follows from the basic premises of thought upon this matter that a woman whose shame is not in the keeping of a man is sexually aggressive and dangerous. The association reaches its extreme representation in the figure of the witch, the unsubjected female who rides upon a broomstick to subvert the

social order sanctified by religion. She is a woman who has foregone the moral qualities of her sex and become the consort of the he-goat. Both in the beliefs regarding the sexuality of widows (whose remarriage it will be remembered, is given the same treatment as the *cabrón*), and regarding the supernatural practices of witches, the same assumption is displayed: once the sexual division of labour breaks down, women become men and where this occurs there can be neither honour nor shame.

Father Haro viewed the matter in these terms and attributed the deplorable state of sexual morality which he strove to reform to the fact that the sexes were abandoning their 'natural' roles in their dress and in their customs. Men were sitting on the floor like women, and women were getting up on to stools. Sodom and Gomorrah all over again! The inevitable result was the *chichisveo* in which all honour was irretrievably lost.

Another writer of the previous century had already demonstrated the thesis in a different way. La Pícara Justina tells the story of a girl who is robbed of her purity by a young man and left dishonoured.[29] She therefore disguises herself as a man and joins the criminal underworld. When finally she finds her betrayer and forces him to marry her (thereby restoring her honour), she reverts to female dress. The parable could not be clearer: a woman stripped of her honour becomes a man. Her honour restored, she reverts to her true sex.

The popular beliefs regarding widows and witches, the ancient churchmen, moralist and novelist, give us a clue to the interpretation of the conceptual chart, not an ethnography. It provides the moral basis for the oppositions associated with the division of labour, so that such a chart now enables us to see coherence in the judgements passed in situations in which *honra*, *hombría* and *vergüenza* are invoked, why the conduct which is honourable for one sex may be the opposite of that which is honourable for the other; why women who adopt male behaviour prejudice their shame, while those who have abandoned their claim to shame are no longer submitted to the sanctions which control the behaviour of honourable women. Such women can behave as men do, attend functions from which honourable women are excluded, and use their sexuality to dominate men, as Father Haro believed all women desired to do. Yet by the same token they also forfeit their hold upon the honour of men. It also en-

titles us to see the victim of the *vito* as an Odysseus who failed to make himself fast and succumbed to the sirens. It is the pollution of his status as a community member rather than his immorality which calls down the wrath of the excommunicatory rite.

We are now in a position to resolve the paradox regarding the women of the aristocracy. Not only are they free of the sanctions which enforce the plebeian code of honour, their status marks them off from the duty to respond to its precepts, not like the shameless whose failure to respond established their dishonourable status, but because by the principle of *honi soit* their honour is impregnable and does not therefore depend upon male protection. Thus the lady of the upper class can command men without inverting the social order, since her power derives from her rank, not from her sexuality. It is not humiliating for a male inferior to obey her orders. She escapes the restraints which weigh upon middle-class wives, since, whatever her conduct, she possesses a status which cannot be forfeited. Her religious duty and her conscience require her to be virtuous and obey her husband, but if she does not do so, she is wicked, she is not dishonoured. She cannot then be stripped of her honour and become a man in the sense in which the plebeian can, thereby threatening the 'natural order', for the natural order for the aristocracy does not depend upon the same conceptualization of the division of labour and the opposition of honour and shame associated with it, and it is not therefore threatened when women escape from the tutelage of men. It has been suggested that male slaves, on account of their inferior status, lack the social personality of men. By an analogous reasoning, women of high birth are accorded on that account a right to the kind of pride which is a male attribute, an element of masculine honour. They do not thereby forfeit their femininity, any more than the slave acquires a feminine status through being denied a masculine one; they acquire in addition some of the moral attributes of the male. Sexual and class status come together to qualify the rules of conduct which apply to their behaviour.

I have examined the conceptions of honour which are held by different classes in Andalusia, plebeian, *señorito* and aristocratic, and the ways in which these are modified by the fact of living in a small isolated township or a big city. Small-town plebeian honour

stood at one extreme and aristocratic honour at the other. In the former, in many of its aspects, honour was allied to shame and equated with virtue; in the latter the yardstick of honour was precedence. The difference was explained, in the same manner as the difference within the *pueblo* between the honour of males or females, by the place of the individual within the social structure.

The dual nature of honour as honour aspired to and honour validated reflects the duality of the aspiration to a role and its attainment. To be dishonoured is to be rejected from the role to which one aspired. 'I am who I am' is answered: 'You are not who you think you are.' The search for identity expressed in these attitudes is the search for a role and the transactions of honour are the means whereby individuals find their role within the social organization. Yet, in a complex society, the structure of common understandings, like the structure of roles, is complex; the criteria of conduct vary, and with them, the meanings attached to the concept of honour. So we can see that, on the one hand, the need for common understandings and the mechanisms of social integration (such as the acceptance of the usage of the upper classes) tend to unify its conceptualization, on the other, the demands of the social structure promote differentiation.

It was suggested at the end of the first part of this essay that the confusion of the meanings honour = precedence and honour = virtue served the function of social integration by crediting the rulers with a claim to esteem and a charter to rule. But it is a function which is fulfilled only as long as the confusion is not recognized as such, and we have seen that this is far from being always the case. Once it is realized that 'honour has gone to the village', there is room for polemic, a polemic which has been carried on for centuries (particularly between the Church and the aristocracy) and of which the disagreement between Montesquieu and Voltaire is only one of a whole number, one which opposed the realism of the noble jurist to the moralism of the bourgeois poet, the 'is' view of honour to the 'ought' view.

The social struggle is visible behind the semantic battle; in a sense, the sense which Speier suggested, it is fought out in words. The rebellion of the agrarian masses of Andalusia was promoted by a concept which illustrates this, '*señoritismo*'; *señorito*, the term of respect towards a member of the ruling class became extended in *señoritismo* to mean the rule of corruption and

social injustice. The vocabulary of honour was subverted by the failure of the *señoritos* to satisfy the claims upon their image. The confusion broke down. But the battle over words is fought out only perhaps to start afresh as the operative pressures of social organization impose themselves and the need resurges to sanctify a new established order. The 'is' becomes 'ought' once more and authority is re-endowed with *mana*.[30] Behind the new order of precedence and the redefined honour the same principles can be seen at work, for if, as Durkheim suggested, 'the idea of force is of religious origin',[31] it is also true that the reality of force possesses the power to sanctify itself.

The conceptual systems which relate to honour provide, when each is taken in its totality and in its varied contexts, a mechanism which distributes power and determines who shall fill the roles of command and dictate the ideal image which people hold of their society. At the ultimate level of analysis honour is the clearing-house for the conflicts in the social structure, the conciliatory nexus between the sacred and the secular, between the individual and society and between systems of ideology and systems of action.

NOTES

THE CONCEPT OF HONOUR

1 *eg* Erving Goffman *The presentation of self in everyday life* (Edinburgh 1956). Also: 'Deference and demeanour' *American Anthropologist* (1956).

2 An excellent example is T. Hooker *An essay on honour* (London 1741) but this was equally true of the Italian Renaissance literature on the subject.

3 Montesquieu ['Esprit des Lois' *Oeuvres* (Paris 1958) Vol. 2, p. 354] viewed this opposition as indicative of a corruption of the principle of monarchy: 'Il se corrompt encore plus lorsque l'honneur a été mis en contradiction avec les honneurs et que l'on peut être à la fois couvert d'infamie et de dignités.' (It is further corrupted when honour has been put in contradiction with honours and it is possible to be covered at the same time with infamy and with titles.)

4 The dual origin is reflected by the former meanings of the English word *valour* which was the leading qualification of honour: it referred both to social status and also to personal excellence.

5 Para Tirso, como para muchos otros autores, habia venido a ser lugar común literario que 'el honor se fué a la aldea'. Castro,

Americo: *Cinco ensayos sobre Don Juan*, Santiago de Chile, n.d., p. 22. (For Tirso, as for many other authors, it had become a literary commonplace that 'honour has gone to the village'.)

6 *Questions sur l'Encyclopédie: Honneur* (Geneva 1774) Tome 3, p. 438. He quotes the Regent, the Duke of Orleans, saying of a certain gentleman: 'C'était un parfait courtisan; il n'avait ni humeur ni honneur.' (He was a perfect courtier; he had no moods and no honour.) 'Le misérable caractère des courtisans' had been discussed, in fact, in *L'Esprit des Lois*, *op. cit.* p. 255.

7 Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan* Ch. 10.

8 *Cf.* F. R. Bryson *The point of honour in Sixteenth Century Italy: an aspect of the life of a gentleman* (Chicago 1935) p. 84.

9 The rituals of dishonour also centre upon the head, of course, as the prevalence of the custom of scalping testifies. Some psychological theories regarding the significance of such customs are discussed from the anthropological point of view by E. R. Leach 'Magical hair' *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (1959).

10 Montesquieu suggests, following Beaumanoir, that since knights disputed honour with their faces covered, in contrast to plebeians the offence to the face carried the connotation of treating a knight as if he were plebeian, that is, of denying his status.

11 'The laundry of honour is only bleached with blood.'

12 G. Simmel *Sociology of Simmel* translated by Kurt Wolf (Glencoe 1950) p. 321.

13 The language of the Spanish Theatre of the Golden Age treats honour almost as if it were a good, something which can be taken from one person by another and which may be owed and restituted.

14 Montesquieu, *op. cit.* p. 826.

15 It is true that there have been cases of duels between women, particularly – and this seems to me highly significant – in the later nineteenth century, but, like lady-bullfighters, these clearly involve a travesty.

16 *op. cit.* p. 820.

17 *Cf.* Montesquieu *op. cit.* p. 262.

18 Tirso de Molina *El Burlador de Sevilla y Convidado de Piedra* Jornada Tercera, lines 641–5

	Honor	Honour
D. Juan:	Tengo, y las palabras cumplo Porque caballero soy.	I have and I keep my word Because I am a gentleman.
D. Gonzalo:	Dame esa mano no temas.	Give me that hand. Don't be afraid.
D. Juan:	Eso dices? Yo temor? Si fueras el mismo infierno, La mano te diera hoy.	What's that you say? Me afraid? If you were hell itself I would give you my hand today.

19 *The approach to the Spanish drama of the Golden Age* (London 1957) p. 13.

20 Ernestine Friedl *Vasilika: a village in modern Greece* (New York 1962) pp. 80, 86.

21 The ambiguity which surrounds this problem is reflected in the discussions of the jurisprudence of duelling; an insult may be answered not by a challenge but by an indictment of lying (the Mentita) which throws on to the insulter the obligation to challenge. Since the challenger loses the choice of weapons there was every advantage in provoking rather than issuing a challenge. The function of the Mentita was to entitle the affronted party to gain the choice of weapons, but it also tended to enable the professional duellist 'to place a chip on his shoulder', provoke whom he pleased and stick to his preferred arms.

22 Marcel Mauss did in fact suggest such a translation. *The Gift* (London 1954) p. 36.

23 *Cf. Eclaircissements sur L'Esprit des Lois op. cit.* pp. 1169, 1180–3. Also, Emile Faguet *La Politique comparée de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire* (Paris 1902) p. 3.

24 The motto of the Order of the Garter, 'Fie on him who thinks ill of it.'

25 *Op. cit.* p. 36.

26 *Cf.* Meyer Fortes *Oedipus and Job in West African Religion* (Cambridge 1959).

27 Hans Speier 'Honour and social structure' in *Social Order and the Risks of War* (New York 1952) pp. 36–52.

HONOUR AND SOCIAL STATUS IN ANDALUSIA

1 J. A. Pitt-Rivers *The People of the Sierra* (Chicago 1961).

2 *Cf. Fuero de los Españoles* (1945) Article 4. *Cf.* also *El Código Penal* Articles 467–75 'Delicts against honour.' It is also implicit in the articles against duelling (439–47) and in the concept of adultery (448–52).

3 *Op. cit.* p. 168.

4 *Cf.* E. Friedl *op. cit.* p. 86.

5 *Op. cit.* p. 113.

6 Even in those which castigate with the epithet 'a double standard' the sexual mores of the Latin countries.

7 It was a commonplace of the theatre of honour, yet its aristocratic cuckolds appear not to be much concerned with questions of responsibility. Their unfortunate women get killed, not as punishment, but because they represent a living testimony to male dishonour.

8 *Op. cit.* p. 116.

9 *Cf.* the definition of *cabrón* in the *Diccionario de la Academia*: 'One who consents to his wife's adultery.'

10 For the Nuer of East Africa, adultery creates a state of pollution but 'it is not the adulterer but the injured husband who is likely to be sick' (E. E. Evans-Pritchard *Nuer Religion* (Oxford 1956) p. 189). A parallel can be found in South Africa in the first fruit ceremonies before which it is prohibited to touch the crops. 'In most South African tribes a breach of this taboo threatened ritual danger not to the transgressor, but to the leader whose right of precedence "was stolen".' Those who broke the taboo were nevertheless punished by the chief. (Max Gluckman *Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa* (Manchester 1954) p. 12.)

11 G. Brenan *South from Granada* (London 1957) p. 48.

12 *Op. cit.* Ch. 10.

13 Approximately 2% of the children born in the period of 1940–50 have no paternity.

14

'El honor	'The honour
que de mi padre heredé	which I inherited from my father
El patrimonio mejor	The best of patrimonies
Que en Valencia espejo fué	Which in Valencia was a mirror
De la nobleza y valor.'	Of nobility and valour.'

Tirso de Molina 'La Villana de Vallecas' *Obras Dramaticas* (Madrid 1952) Vol. 2, p. 792.

15 Thus, in place of the symbolism of the head 'standing for' the genitalia as in the Freudian interpretation, we have here a word for the genitalia being used to 'stand for' the quality which is commonly expressed by an analogy with the head.

16 *The Spaniards in their History* trs. Walter Starkie (New York 1950) p. 121.

17 *Cf.* Michael Kenny *A Spanish Tapestry* (Bloomington 1962).

18 In the cases of ostracism on account of sexual conduct of which I have heard, the victim was always a woman whose status was insecure from the point of view of birth.

19 This sense of the word cuckold is not, of course, unique to modern Spain. Anouilh, in *Ardèle ou la Marguerite* (Paris 1949, p. 81), ridicules the notion of honour contained in this conception of cuckoldry by making the lover challenge the husband to a duel on the

20 suspicion that he has seduced his own wife.

Another figurative form produces the word *cabronada* which according to the *Diccionario de la Academia* means: 'an infamous action which is permitted against one's honour' and applies in fact to any shameful action. We might also point out that in Mexico the word *cabrón* has lost, in popular usage, all association with

cuckoldry and, with this, the symbolism of the horns which is not understood outside the circle of the educated. A comparison of the values and symbolism of honour in Spain and in the New World is badly needed.

21 Carl A. Thimm *Fencing and Duelling* (London 1896) gives statistics, only unfortunately for Italy, in the period of 1879–89. It is interesting however that he finds the causes distributed among politics, card-games, religious discussion and only eight per cent of 'serious insults' which may be taken to include sexual honour. I do not have the impression from the many duels cited by Thimm that Italy was exceptional in this regard.

22 Robert Redfield *The Folk Culture of Yucatán* (Chicago 1941).

23 *Don Juan* (Buenos Aires 1942). Marañon is another writer who fails to perceive that Don Juan is a man of honour=precedence and that the theme of the play is, precisely, a critique of this theory of honour – a fact which is surely congruent with the circumstance that the author was a priest.

24 *El Chichisveo impugnado por el R.P.* Fr. Joseph Haro (Seville 1729).

25 *El mayor imposible.* Lope makes clear in the last line of the play that he thought his thesis was unlikely to be put to the test.

26 *Cf.* Stendhal 'L'amour s'empara bien vite de l'usage des sigisbées.' *Promenades dans Rome* (Paris 1940) vol. 3, p. 88. Stendhal, incidentally, followed certain Italian authors in attributing the introduction of the *cicisbeo* in Italy to the Spaniards.

27 Pitt-Rivers *op. cit.* p. 175.

28 Haro *op. cit.* p. 12 'que las mugeres naturalmente son ambiciosas del mando y de la libertad y que quieren invertir el orden de la naturaleza, solicitando (aunque sea con la execución de las mayores crueldades) dominar a los hombres'. Father Haro's appeal to the order of nature must not be taken to be no more than the ranting of a baroque Sevillian priest. It bears some relation to those universal values which were examined, for example, by Robert Hertz in his great essay *The Pre-eminence of the Right Hand* in *Death and the Right Hand* (London 1960).

29 Andrés Pérez de León *La Pícara Justina* (Madrid 1912).

30 *Cf.* Luc de Heusch 'Pour une dialectique de la Sacralité du pouvoir' in Heusch (ed.) *Le Pouvoir et le Sacré* (Brussels 1962).

31 E. Durkheim *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* trs. J. W. Swain (London 1915) p. 204.